

Inadequacy of Air Raid Protection

The principal prisoner of war camps in Essen were Kraemerplatz, Raumerstrasse, Bottropstrasse, and Noegerathstrasse. There is no substantial controversy with respect to the prosecution's description of the conditions prevailing in these camps as to air raid protection and it is fully supported by the evidence. Originally, the French prisoners of war were housed in Kraemerplatz. They were transferred to Bottropstrasse in March, 1942. That camp was destroyed in an air raid in 1943, and the prisoners were then moved to Noegerathstrasse where they remained to the end of the war notwithstanding that the camp was hit at least six times in air raids, twice severely. Bottropstrasse was in the area of the Cast Steel Factory and Kraemerplatz was immediately adjoining. Noegerathstrasse was some distance away but was close to the main line of a railroad. The proximity of these camps, particularly the first three, to the 80-odd Krupp factories in Essen, rendered them extremely dangerous. The responsibility for the selection of the camp sites and their equipment was upon the firm, subject to the approval of representatives of the Stalag. In September, 1939, after the outbreak of war, the Krupp officials immediately anticipated that the Krupp buildings would be bombed. This affirmatively appears from the testimony of Schroeder, a Krupp official.

Nevertheless, the prisoner of war camps were located in about as dangerous places as could be found. Presumably, the location was due in part at least to the fact that proximity to the factories would prevent loss of working time in going to and from the camps. However this may be, it is certain that the camps were located in an area that was subject to bombing attacks; that these became increasingly severe as the war progressed, and that never at any time were adequate shelters provided. In 1941, at Kraemerplatz, there existed air raid shelters in the form of slit

trenches. The Stalag protested that these facilities offer shrapnel proof protection for 220-225 men at most, whereas the total complement of the camp at that time was 450. Correction of the situation was delayed by the firm because "of the possibility of moving the prisoner of war camp." The number of inmates had reached 600 by a year later and so far as appears from the credible evidence the request of Stalag had not been complied with.

A railway tunnel served as the air raid shelter at Noegerathstrasse where between 1200 and 1500 prisoners lived. The tunnel was sufficient to accommodate about two-thirds of that number. Noegerathstrasse was practically destroyed by an air raid in 1944. Nevertheless the French prisoners of war remained there. On June 12, 1944, the medical officer in charge of the camp protested to Dr. Jaeger, senior camp physician, that there were 170 men living in a "damp railway tunnel not suitable for permanent accommodation of human beings." The medical treatment was given out of doors and those living in the plants were forced to go for sick call to a burned out public house; that medical orderlies were sleeping in a men's ^{laboratory} ~~laboratory~~ and that drugs and wound dressings were lacking." The same conditions existed three months later. On September 2, 1944, Dr. Jaeger wrote the defendants Ihn and Kupke, among others, that the camp "is in a terrible condition. The people living in ash bins, dog kennels, old baking ovens and self made huts. The food is barely sufficient. Krupp is responsible for housing and feeding. The supply of medicine and bandages is so extremely bad that proper medical treatment was not possible in many cases. This fact is detrimental to the prisoner of war camp. It is astonishing that the number of sick is not higher than it is and it

moves between 9 and 10 percent. It is also understandable that there is not much willingness to work when conditions are such as they are mentioned above. When complaints are made that many of the prisoners of war are absent from work for one or two days, the camp can be blamed to a great extent for having insufficient organization."

As a result, two barracks were built for the prisoners. There has been no substantial attempt on the part of the defense to deny that the accommodations at Noegerathstrasse were not as described. The insistence is that the French prisoners of war themselves insisted upon remaining there because of the protection against air raids which the railroad tunnel afforded them, notwithstanding that another camp for their accommodation had been built at another location. The testimony of Borschmeyer, the representative of the Stalag, a witness for the defendants, describes the situation and gives the results. He stated:

"This camp was rebuilt several times. When, one day, it was again completely wiped off the map - and I think on the day of the air raid or at the latest the day after this air raid - I visited this camp, together with Dr. Lehmann whom I used to accompany through the camps in cases like this, and on this occasion Dr. Lehmann said he could not take the responsibility for rebuilding the camp which, if you are superstitious, you might say had its fate cut out for itself, that it was over and over again destroyed whilst the adjacent camp was hardly ever hit -- he told me he could not take the responsibility for rebuilding this camp in the same place. Another camp was prepared, which I visited at that time, which from the point of view of space and in every other respect was without fault. When I told the prisoners of war that they would be transferred to this new camp the spokesman of the French prisoners of war came to me and requested me - I should even say he entreated me - to leave his fellow prisoners in the camp in the Noegerathstrasse, although the camp had been completely destroyed. And the unfortunate people lived in the most primitive possible conditions, and his reason was this: Immediately adjacent to the camp there was a railroad shelter with an extremely strong layer of cement on top,

"and in this railroad underpass which was not open to traffic any more, Krupp had set up a large straw depot, and there the prisoners of war found shelter. The best possible shelter was in this railroad underpass, and they could lie there during the whole night. And that was the reason the spokesman gave me for his fellow prisoners of war wanting to remain at the Noegerathstrasse camp under those primitive conditions, rather than to move into a new and nicer camp. He told me literally, the 'railroad tunnel is our life insurance.' I repeated this to Dr. Lehmann, who immediately stated his willingness to let the prisoners of war stay in Noegerathstrasse, and to rebuild the camp once more, I believe for the sixth time."

The witness further testified that the Frenchmen volunteered to rebuild the camp themselves and did so. The railway tunnel referred to could accommodate but approximately half the prisoners. The others lived in the plants of the Cast Steel Factory which was a target for increasingly severe air raids.

We do not think that the testimony of Borschmeyer presents a defense to the violation of the obligation of the Krupp firm to furnish adequate air raid protection to the prisoners of war. Quite apart from the fact that it was illegal to employ them at all for war work, and to employ them in so dangerous an area, it was the duty of the employers to see that these prisoners were properly housed and furnished with adequate air raid protection. They were helpless and in a very real sense they were wards of their masters.

As before said, the Russian prisoners of war began to arrive in Essen in 1942. They were located in Raumerstrasse, Hafenstrasse and Herderstrasse. A report by Eichmeier to the defendant Lehmann, of an inspection of camp Herderstrasse, on October 13, 1942, offered in evidence by the defense, states among other things:

"Air raid precaution implements are missing altogether. Air raid slit trench for both guards and prisoners is also missing."

With respect to Raumerstrasse, it was reported on October 16, that Stalag representatives had made an inspection and that they had found "there are no air raid installations for the guards or the prisoners of war. One could not help gaining the impression that the space needed for same was not considered in the planning."

On January 15, 1943, the defendant Lehmann reported to the Housing Administration that "yesterday Captain Fiene of the local guard area called me and said that slit trenches for the protection against splinters would have to be provided as soon as possible in the prisoner of war camps." Hafenstrasse camp was completely destroyed in a raid in March, 1943, and at that time still lacked even slit trenches as air raid protection.

In January 11, 1943, the defendant Lehmann reported as follows:

"On Saturday, 9 January at 22.30 the district guard officer, Hauptmann (Captain) Dahlmann, rang me up and told me that the guards in our POW camps in Raumerstrasse were only just able to suppress a revolt among the Russian POW's on the occasion of the air-raid on Essen. In the opinion of Hauptmann (Captain) Dahlmann the reason why the POW's become restive is that in the Raumerstrasse camp there are no slit trenches. He urgently requests that such trenches be dug in order among other things not to disturb the surrounding civilian population in case of serious trouble."

A copy of this report was sent to the defendants Loeser, Krupp, Ihn and Kupke, among others.

It further appears from a defense document that the prisoners lacked even enough sand to put out phosphorous bombs which fell around the camp.

The defense evidence was to the effect that there

was available to the prisoners at Raumerstrasse "a passageway underneath the railroad tracks" which they used as an air raid shelter. At this camp, there were from 1200--1500 prisoners and the witness admitted that the passageway could not accommodate that number so that during an air raid the remainder had to stay in camp and use slit trenches which finally had been built as the result of the report of defendant Lehmann above set forth.

Discrimination in the matter of air raid protection is also shown by the testimony of the defense witness Marquardt who worked in one of the numerous factories in Essen, utilizing the labor of concentration camp inmates and French prisoners of war, as well as of other nationalities. In the summer and fall of 1944, air attacks had become increasingly frequent. The devastating effect had been fully demonstrated. As counsel for the defense says the factories of the Gusstahlfabrik had indeed become a battleground. Protection during working hours was no less essential than in the camps. Marquardt testified that at that time the German employees used a new air raid shelter which had been built for them. The concentration camp inmates used a "day room" in the factory, formerly used by the German employees, which had been reinforced with protective walls and a concrete ceiling. The French prisoners of war were compelled to use a tunnel which they had dug in a slag heap outside the camp.

Illegal Use of French POWs

By way of justifying the use of French prisoners of war in armament industry it is claimed that this was authorized by an agreement with the Vichy government made through the Ambassador to Berlin. As to this, it first may be said that there was no credible evidence of any such agreement. No written treaty or agreement was produced. The most any witness said was he understood there had been such agreement with Laval, communicated to competent Reich authorities by the Vichy ambassador. If, so, there is no trustworthy evidence that any of these defendants acted upon the strength of it or even personally knew of it.

Moreover, if there was any such agreement it was void under the law of nations. There was no treaty of peace between Germany and France but only an armistice, the validity of which for present purpose only may be assumed. It did not put an end to the war between those two countries but was only intended to suspend hostilities between them. This was not fully accomplished. In France's overseas possessions and on allied soil, French armed forces fighting under the command of Free French authorities waged war against Germany. In occupied France more and more Frenchmen actively resisted the invader and the overwhelming majority of the population was in full sympathy with Germany's opponents. Under such circumstances we have no hesitancy in reaching the conclusion that if Laval or the Vichy ambassador to Berlin made any agreement such as that claimed with respect to the use of French prisoners of war in German armament production, it was manifestly contra bonus mores and hence void.

In view of this conclusion it is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the Vichy government was legally established according to the requirements of the French constitution.

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FOREIGN CIVILIAN WORKERS AND CONCENTRATION
CAMP INMATES

After weighing the evidence the Tribunal finds that the facts on this aspect of the case as summarized by the prosecution have, in essence, been proven.

During the war, Dutch, Belgian and French workers employed in Germany were referred to as Western workers. The Czechs in many ways were treated by the Krupp Firm like Western workers, although upon some occasions they were subjected to the same mistreatment as so-called Eastern workers. Among the Western workers, a distinction was made between "free" labor and "convict" labor. The "free" workers were treated better than all of the other classes of labor with which we are concerned here. They had better rations and more liberty. They were, however, not free to leave their work and were also otherwise deprived of many basic rights. The employment of those foreign workers who entered and stayed in the employ of the Krupp organization on a genuinely voluntary basis was, of course, not reprehensible. But an ever-increasing majority of the "free workers" were compelled to sign contracts, and if they refused to do so, they were liable to be sent to penal camps. At the end of their contractual period of employment, the "contract" was unilaterally considered renewed. If one of them failed to report for work, he was treated as "slacking", and also deprived of the small and insufficient food rations. Often, they would be reported to the Gestapo. Those who left their employment with the Krupp Firm were charged with "breach of contract" and frequently were sent to a punishment camp maintained by the Gestapo. In the punishment camps, they were treated very badly. Their rations there were the same as those given to Eastern workers. They were confined behind barbed

wire; their movements were severely restricted; they were beaten frequently, and the distances they were required to walk to and from work were long. They were mistreated in many other respects, such as being denied packages and letters, forbidden to attend religious services, and given no pay.

Until the Spring of 1942, only certain groups of so-called Western workers were actually compelled to go into Germany. At that time, Sauckel's Labor Mobilization Program became effective, and compulsory labor laws were enacted in the occupied countries. As stated in the International Military Tribunal Judgment (IMT), the following appears:

"Sauckel's instructions, too were that foreign labor should be recruited on a voluntary basis, but also provided that 'where, however, in the occupied territories, the appeal for volunteers does not suffice, obligatory service and drafting must under all circumstances be resorted to.' Rules requiring labor service in Germany were published in all the occupied territories."

Wholesale man hunts were conducted and able-bodied men were shipped to Germany as "convicts" without having been charged or convicted of any offense. Many were confined in a penal camp for three months during which time they were required to work for industrial plants. If their conduct met with approval they were graduated to the status of so-called "free" labor. This was a misnomer as they were detained under compulsion. As applied to the Krupp Firm particularly, the taking of slave labor to Dechenschule and Neerfeldschule penal camps will be discussed later, as well as their treatment while there and while employed by the Krupp Firm. The Western slave laborers employed by the Krupp Firm were procured in various ways. Some had signed contracts under compulsion; some because of their special skills had been ordered to go to Germany, and others had been

taken because they belonged to a particular age group. Some of those who had endeavored to evade compulsory service referred to as "convicts", with others picked up in manhunts, were required to go to Germany and work for the Krupp Firm. Subordinates of the defendant Lehmann were sent to occupied countries to secure workers. Lehmann went to Paris in 1942 "to take part in the negotiations concerning group recruitments." In October, 1942, Hennig, an employee of the Krupp Firm was sent to France to assist in "the selection of the drafted individuals for Krupp". The number of French workers employed by the Krupp Firm in the Cast Steel Factory at Essen rose from 293 as of October, 1942 to 5,811 in March, 1943.

In a report made by the defendant Lehmann and dated 21 December 1942, concerning his recent trip to Paris for the purpose of obtaining French labor to be "recruited" he said;

"All authorities concerned in Paris and in the rest of France repeatedly stressed the very great importance of good accommodations for French workers. Letters in which the French workers complain about bad accommodations, treatment, food and shortage of labor in the factories are very harmful to the German recruiting program and are used by the opposition as welcome propaganda. Factories against which such complaints are made may be excluded from ^{future} allotments of workers.

"Unfortunately such complaints have also been received concerning Krupp. Documentary proof will be produced. Immediately everything possible must be done to refute these complaints, and to ensure that no justified grounds for complaints exists in the future."

This clearly indicates that the expressed desire to improve the living conditions of foreign workers

was motivated by the fear that future allotments of workers might not be had if the existing conditions continued. It was not because of any sympathy for the workers.

The defendant Lehmann had a Krupp representative go to Holland in October, 1942, who remained there for two years and reported regularly to Lehmann. The number of Dutch workers employed by the Krupp Firm in Essen rose from thirty-three in June 1942 to almost 1700 in March 1943. Likewise, a representative of the Krupp Firm was sent to Belgium. He was in Liege from where Belgian workers were sent to Dechenschule.

In May 1941, a Dutch concern was required to transfer a group of its workers to work for the Krupp Firm at the Germaniawerke at Kiel. The Krupp Firm benefitted by the program instituted to compel 30,000 workers skilled in the iron producing trade to go to Germany. On the 24th of April, 1942 at the time of the announcement of the Stuckel operation, the Krupp Firm filed a request for 1300 skilled Dutch workers, and another request was filed for a smaller number of skilled workers. Some Dutch workers who refused to sign contracts and go to Germany were sent to a camp maintained by the Gestapo in Holland. From there, they were shipped to Germany under guard, and afterwards many of them were employed as foreign labor by the Krupp Firm.

Dutch workers who attempted to escape from compulsory service in the Krupp Firm, were arrested, confined in the penal camp, and returned to the Krupp Firm. In September 1942, the Krupp Firm wrote to the Main Department of Social Administration at Amsterdam, complaining that a large number of Dutch workers had not returned from leave. It was pointed out that the service of these

workers was to be secured by conscription, if necessary, and it was requested that the workers be returned to Essen. Those Dutch workers who could be arrested were then sent back to the Krupp Firm. They were confined in the penal camp, Neerfeldschule until they had earned the status of so-called "free" workers.

Czech workers sent to Essen for training for work in the Berthawerke were required to sign contracts. If they were recaptured at the firm's request and first sent to a Labor Education camp and while confined required to work for the Krupp Firm.

At the Berthawerke, one of the many large plants owned and operated by the Krupp Firm, the slave laborers were required to work twelve hours daily, and many had only every third Sunday off. A witness, Brandejs, was required at one time, during three weeks to work shifts of 36 hours each with twelve hours off between each shift. The food rations furnished to these workers by the Krupp Firm at the Berthawerke were grossly inadequate and the workers had to help to sustain themselves as well as they could, by food received from their families' meager supplies at home. They were not afforded sufficient protection from air raids.

Brutal recruitment drives were conducted in Belgium in 1944, and many Belgians were treated as "convicts". When, after a usual period of three months of punishment, they became so-called "free workers", they were given back their clothing, permitted greater freedom, and were paid wages. Some in this class were employed by the Krupp Firm.

Penal camps were maintained by the Krupp Firm at Grusonwerke, at Friedrich Alfred Huette and at Essen.

Those at Essen were known as Dechenschule and Neerfeldschule. Slave laborers used by the Krupp Firm who failed to work sufficiently hard, or who endeavored to leave their work, were reported to the Werkschutz and their report was frequently forwarded to the Gestapo with the request that action be taken. Those arrested were usually sentenced to serve 56 days in labor discipline cases, and three months for violating so-called labor "contracts".

In 1943 it became apparent that slave laborers reported to the Gestapo for punishment, were not always sent back at the expiration of their sentences. In October of that year the defendant von Buelow made plans and laid down the conditions for the operation of a penal camp of its own by the Krupp Firm at the Gusstahlfabrik. It was planned at first entirely for Krupp workers, and to be operated as long as convenient to the firm. These regulations for the operation of the camp by the defendant von Buelow emphasized the fact that the camp was primarily for disciplinary purpose. In January 1944, construction of the camp was under way. Von Buelow took it upon himself to make sure that iron bars were installed in the windows, that locks were put on the doors, and that an air raid shelter was provided for the guards. The camp was in operation in March 1944. After its establishment, it was used as a place of detention and punishment for Western slave laborers, particularly Belgians who were sent to Germany as draft evaders. About 90 percent of the inmates were Belgians, the remainder being French, Italian, Polish, Yugoslavian, Bulgarian, Chinese and Algerian. On some occasions Eastern workers were committed to the camp by the Werkschutz of the Krupp Firm as punishment.

Many of the so-called Belgian "convicts" were able-bodied young men who were useful as labor. Others were those who sought to escape slavery in Germany. In a memorandum from the defendant von Buelow appears the following:

"I would like to point out that workers from the special camp may be employed only with my permission - and I have to get previous permission from the secret police in charge of the camp. It must be remembered that primary requisite in the special camp is to 'educate' the men, the urgency of the work is only secondary".

Dechenschule was surrounded by barbed wire and patrolled by a guard. The inmates were guarded at all times, even while at work in the Krupp plants. Upon their arrival, they were told that they were prisoners, and their heads were shaved. They were issued convict clothing, blue suits striped with yellow. They could not leave the camp without such suits. They were given wooden shoes which produced sores. One of the inmates of the camp, a Catholic priest, testified as follows:

"At 4:30 in the morning the guard would open the rooms, unlock and shout "Aufstehen" which means "get up". He would come in with a piece of rubber hose which he would use for those who were not quick enough for his tastes. Between 5:00 and 5:10 a.m. there would be the first morning gathering. I wouldn't call it a roll call because we didn't have any names and any numbers at that time yet; it was therefore only a gathering and would not last long. It was simply that so and so many what they called "Stueck", so and so many pieces of human material would be numbered, pointed out for certain detachments and as soon as there were sufficient persons for that detachment, the guard would have them form ranks and then would march them to the factory section in question in silence.

"The work started at 6:00 a.m. There was an interval between 9:00 and 9:15 and - that is a.m., another interval between 1:00 and 1:30 p.m. and the work would stop according to the various detachments between 5:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. after which the detachment would be brought back by the guards also in ranks and also in silence, back to the camps.

"Again, there was only a gathering and only the numbers were called up, that is, not the numbers of the prisoners, but they were simply counted to see that the same number came back from the detachment as had gone to the detachment. Then, between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. before that, first the first soup distribution and then between 6:00 and 6:30 when all the detachments had come back from work there would be the evening roll call, very long, sometimes even endless and only after that there was the distribution of the second ladle of soup and also of the bread ration which had to last until the next evening. Then at 7:30, 8:00 one could go out within the limits of the camp or else go and wash to the room, but all that lasted until only 8:30 because at 8:30, as I stated before, the guard would come and put lock and chain on the door and lock us in."

The inmates were deliberately assigned to heavy and dirty work in plants of the Krupp Firm. The food, consisting of liquid and little else at night was inadequate for men performing the labor required by the inmates. On occasions, the earlier arrivals in the evening would consume the soup, which was often sour and nothing was left for the others upon their arrival. A witness who had been confined in the Neerfeldschule penal camp, testified that inmates ate the mice that infested the camp. Because of the improper nourishment, at least fifteen died on account of illness and malnutrition. Mistreatment in the camp was a daily occurrence. Beatings were a part of the life at Dechenschule. They were usually administered in the camp cellar. A witness called by the defense, who admitted that he beat inmates said he did so on the order of the camp commander and deputy camp leader. They were beaten with a four-edge leather truncheon, three-quarters of an inch thick. It was furnished by the deputy camp leader. The beaten men were denied medical assistance. In fact no real medical facilities were available to the prisoners. The so-called dispensary was a dirty room and was described by a witness as follows:

"Besides that, the dispensary was in the barracks, arranged over another room where inmates also slept, and the dust, the dirt, and even the excrements contained in the containers for human necessities would go through the floor and through the wooden planks into the other room, and therefore the inmates had great reason to complain". ***

The problem of the medical care of these men was discussed at the time with the defendant Lehmann. They were denied religious consolation. As an air raid shelter, they were allowed to use only a trench, although adequate air raid protection was available nearby. In consequence, 61 of them lost their lives when the trench was hit in an air raid and medical assistance was not made available for more than 24 hours. After the destruction of Dechenschule, the penal camp was transferred to Neerfeldschule. There the conditions were worse than at Dechenschule. For example, the credible testimony of a former inmate was to the effect that the inmates fought for a dry spot on which to sleep at night, and that those who lost were forced to stand on their feet all night. -96-

Both the Dechenschule and the Neerfeldschule camps belonged to the Krupp Firm. The inadequate and limited facilities that existed there were provided by the firm's officials. The firm was responsible for supplying adequate air raid shelters. The food was provided by it. The guards were members of the Krupp Werkschutz. The inmates worked in Krupp plants to which they were assigned by officials of the firm. Their clothes were provided by the firm. Medical treatment was also the responsibility of the firm. The prisoners were beaten by guards in its employ.

The defendant von Buelow arranged for the confinement in Dechenschule of foreign workers who had been reported to the head of the Werkschutz for lack of discipline or other reasons. Although the defendants' defenses are discussed elsewhere, it seems advisable to point out here that in connection with the claim made for the defendants by their lawyers that the defendants did not act voluntarily, but under necessity, that the defendant von Buelow, who was Krupp's chief counter-intelligence officer as well as head of the plant police, wrote the minutes of a meeting with the Gestapo on March 14, 1944 concerning Dechenschule. In the minutes he noted that he had "pointed out to Kriminalrat Nohles that the question of labor allocation is decisive for us, and that we would like to secure these valuable French workers for ourselves for this reason."

The responsibility for the Dechenschule camp is not limited to the defendant von Buelow. Each of the defendants, except Loeser, Pfirsch and Korschan, participated in the establishment and maintenance of the camp. The defendants Janssen, Houdremont, Erich Mueller and Alfried Krupp as members of the Vorstand had to approve the expenditures made for it. The evidence indicates that von Buelow discussed its establishment with the directorate. Moreover the conclusion is inescapable that the then members knew of and approved of the project. The defendants Ihn and Eberhardt received copies of the minutes of the meeting of a

Special Labor Allocation Officers, in which the establishment of the camp was announced.

Food and medical treatment in the camp were the responsibility of the Main Camp administration headed by the defendant Kupke. The camp leader of Dechenschule, Fritz Fuehrer, regularly attended defendant Kupke's weekly conferences. The medical care was discussed by Dr. Jaeger with the defendant Lehmann. Transports of workers from Belgium were arranged by the Labor Allocation Office under the defendant Lehmann. Kupke and Lehmann were both responsible to Ihn, who recieved copies of such papers as the medical agreement covering the workers. The conference held on 14 March 1944, in connection with the treatment and employment of the inmates at Dechenschule, was attended by representatives of Kupke's department, the Main Camp Administration; Lehmann's department, Labor Allocation A and of one of Houdremont's departments, as well as by von Buelow. Representatives of the same departments attended another conference on the employment of Dechenschule inmates one week later.

The allocation of all foreign workers, including the inmates of Dechenschule, was the function of Labor Allocation I, which was responsible to the defendant Houdremont from the time it was established. Men from the camp worked in the Furnace Plant, at Rolling Mill I, at the Sheet Iron Rolling Mill, at the Boiler Plant and other plants within the Gusstahlfabrik. Some of them worked in the Main Administration Building where were the offices of the defendants Krupp, Janssen, Houdremont, Ihn, Lehmann, Kupke and von Buelow. The defendants Janssen, Eberhardt, Houdremont, von Buelow, Ihn, Mueller, Kupke and Lehmann necessarily saw the inmates either at their work or on their way to and from the camp.

Fritz Fuehrer, the camp leader at Dechenschule, complained to the defendant von Buelow that air raid shelters in the camp were not sufficient in number and quality adequately to protect all of the inmates, and that for four weeks no protection from bombing attacks had been provided for them as they were not allowed to leave their

camps during the raids. The defendant von Buelow was responsible for administrative matters connected with the camp Dechenschule, subject to the supervision and control of the Gestapo.

As early as September, 1942, plans had been made "to provide a special arrest barracks where the punished detainees will be centrally lodged".

Fritz Fuchrer who was appointed camp leader of Dechenschule in February of 1944 by defendant Kupke, complained to Kupke about the poor quality and insufficiency of the food.

On 12 January 1944, a discussion was had by the Special Labor Allocation Officers. The defendant von Buelow gave a lecture during this discussion. He said in part as follows:

"Foreigners must be treated with greater severity for strictness. For them, punishment away from work is especially suitable. Dechenschule will become a penal camp for Eastern workers and Poles, under the supervision of the Gestapo. They are to be cared for by the Main Administration for the Workers Camps and Works Security Police. * * * "

He invited Special Labor Allocation officers "to enumerate especially difficult and dirty work for which these foreigners may be used in groups of 50-60." Reports were to be made to the defendant von Buelow. He also said, "An application for special leave from Italian civilians is prima facie untrustworthy".

Civilians from Poland and Russia were first brought to Essen in large numbers in 1942. In January 1942, the Gusstahlfabrik employed five Russians and sixty-seven Poles. In April 1942, 319 Russians and 462 Poles were employed. By the end of the year, the Gusstahlfabrik employed 5,787 Russians and 1,046 Poles. In October, 1944, 3535 Russians and 1,210 Polish workers were employed. The decline in the number of Eastern workers from 1943 until the end of the war was caused particularly by the evacuation of sections of the Gusstahlfabrik, and the workers were taken to other plants of the Krupp Firm. Eastern workers were also employed in the Krupp plants Elmag, Suedwerke, Berthawerke, at the Friedrich Alfred Huette and at the Germaniawerke.

On 1 July 1942, the Krupp Firm had pending a request for 8819 workers, although it had received 6844 workers including 3439 Russians during the preceding two months. In requesting these workers, the firm advised the labor allocation authorities that there were no "substantial difficulties concerning billeting", and complained that the allocations to them had been insufficient. In consequence, Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, was directed "to allocate to firm Krupp 3 - 4,000 more workers in entire convoys from those Russian civilian workers presently arriving in Defense District VI". Upon their arrival at Essen workers were assigned to different shops and factories of Gusstahlfabrik. They were employed in the Foundries, Rolling Mills and Forges which, as part of the "Steel Plants" were at that time subordinate to the defendant Korschan; the "Machine Plants" and General Machine Construction where finished armaments were made and the Locomotive Plant. The latter shops, as part of the "Machinery Plant" were subordinate to the defendant Erich Mueller after the reorganization of the Vorstand in March 1943. At that time, the defendant Houdremont, who had previously been Korschan's deputy, took over the Foundries, including the "Steel Plants", formerly under the supervision of Korschan. Eastern workers continued to be employed in the Gusstahlfabrik until the occupation by the Allied troops. The Krupp Firm sent an employee to Poland to select workers who should be recruited for Krupp service.

The Eastern workers and the Russian prisoners of war were treated worse than all other classes of foreign workers, with the exception of concentration camp victims and the inmates of "labor education camps". Upon arrival, they were put under guard behind barbed wire in very bad camps; they were brought back and forth to work under guard. On alternate Sundays, particularly deserving Eastern workers were allowed to take walks under the supervision of a German guard. They were compelled to wear distinguishing badges.

The food was of very poor quality and not sufficient in amount. They were required to work very hard and received very little compensation. Some of these conditions improved as time went on, others did not improve but, on the contrary, became worse. The treatment of the Eastern workers was inhumane.

The status of Eastern workers was declared to be that of prisoners. The defendant Ihn, in a memorandum to the works managers dated 13 March 1942, stated, "The Russian civilian workers are to be treated in the same way as prisoners of war. Any sympathy is false pity, which the courts will not accept as an excuse." Again, on 29 November 1943, the defendant Ihn advised the plant managers that "Eastern Workers and Poles are subject to obligatory service for an unlimited period".

At first only a very few were permitted to leave the camp on alternate Sundays under guard. In 1943 this was changed, and Eastern workers who could obtain passes from the camp management were allowed to be out until dusk. Later this privilege was restricted or revoked. In October, 1943, over a year after the Eastern workers arrived, the defendant Ihn sent a circular to the plants advising that Eastern workers should be escorted to and from work by guards except when trustworthy Eastern workers, appointed "troop leaders" are available. He pointed out that the number of such workers and the name of the "troop Leader" must be indicated upon a written application made out in triplicate. On 26 May 1944, the defendant, von Buelow, gave substantially the same instructions to a Krupp employee.

As further indication of the direct control had by the Krupp Firm over the activities of the Eastern workers, reference is made to a memorandum by the defendant Ihn in September 1942 in which he said, "Eastern workers, whose conduct and output in the plant are good and whose behavior in the camp is blameless may be allowed once in a while to go out under supervision. If possible they shall be led out every second Sunday. ****

"Only reliable members of the working force ** may be chosen as escorts. Further instructions are laid down in a directive which will be issued to the escorts by the workpolice. * * "

The defendant von Buelow voluntarily aided in the restrictions placed upon these unfortunate people. This is shown by a memorandum from him to the defendants Lehmann and Kupke, dated 22 October 1943 in which he said, "It is indeed very deplorable that the general order which prohibits visits to German stores by Eastern workers is being violated so frequently. In any case we should hold to the rule that on their way to and from work the detachments remain in closed ranks and that then visits to stores cannot be made."

The Reich Group Industry on 4 June 1942, by letter forwarded to the District Group Northwest of the Economic Group Iron Producing Industry to its members said: "Camps will not be fenced in with barbed wire. Where barbed wire has been used it will be removed." Notwithstanding this, on 4 August 1942, the defendant von Buelow sent to the Krupp Housing Administration through the defendant Lehmann, after an inspection of the Eastern workers camp at Spenlestrasse, instructions that, "The barbed wire fence should be made much stronger." A month later, Dr. Beusch, a subordinate of the defendant Loeser, recognized the official instructions in the following words, "The fencing in of the Eastern workers' barracks with barbed wire is inadmissible. Same must be dispensed with in the future so that no objections will be raised. The removal of the existing barbed-wire fences will be discussed at the next meeting."

The defendant von Buelow, however, continued to oppose the removal of the barbed wire fences. Even Hitler expressed his surprise that "The civilian Russians are kept behind barbed wire fences like prisoners of war."

On 25 April, 1942 a decree was issued by Himmler, Chief of the Gestapo and the SS, in which it was stated that the camps must not be enclosed with barbed wire, and that barbed wire already in use for this purpose must be removed unless no other wire can be procured. As late as March 1943, the Eastern workers' camps under the Main Camp Administration of the Krupp Firm were still surrounded by barbed-wire fences.

The camps in which the Eastern workers were confined were over-crowded, very dirty and inadequate in many ways. Although the Krupp Firm represented to the labor allocation authorities in July 1942 that there were no "substantial difficulties concerning billeting", it was not prepared in the Fall of that year to take care of the foreign workers brought to Essen at its own request. Long before the damage caused by the Allied air raids on Essen, the housing of the slave laborers by the Krupp Firm of Essen was totally inadequate.

On one occasion, the Ministry of Armament and Munitions was advised by the Krupp firm that the latter could billet 8000 workers requested. The day after this, the department of the Krupp Firm responsible for housing the workers informed the building office that "the miserable conditions at Camp Spenlestrasse have reached a stage which could hardly be surpassed." This condition was due to the fact that Eastern workers were put into the camps before the camps were finished, and while they lacked toilets, washrooms and other essentials. As noted by the defendant von Buelow in August 1942, at Amalienstrasse, "For approximately 150 in the camp there is just one latrine and one toilet available." The washing and lavatory facilities for the women's camps were still incomplete, after the Eastern workers had moved into the Spenlestrasse camp and which then housed over 1400 people. More workers were placed in the camps than they could accommodate. Some of the Eastern workers employed by the Krupp Firm were housed in tents, notwithstanding the cold weather, and others were in huts without any heat.

The lives of the workers were constantly in jeopardy. Although one camp was destroyed four times between March 1944 and the end of the war, the Eastern Workers were kept in it during that time because the plant management desired that foreign workers be at their working places for the duration of all shifts. This lack of protection against air raids resulted, of course, in the death of many of the Eastern workers, and, in fact, certain statistics concerning these deaths were made by the Krupp Firm.

In June 1944, approximately one thousand of the Eastern workers lived in a Krupp camp referred to as Voerde. An equal number lived at Luescherhof, a Krupp camp within the premises of Gusstahlfabrik, and in Krupp camps attached directly to the plants in which they worked, such as, Machine Construction 10, Mechanical Workshop 2 and Armor Construction 4. Another thousand lived at Rabenhorst and Frintrop Ost, also run by the Krupp Firm and both within the city limits of Essen. These Eastern

workers were moved closer to the area of danger from air raids and were made part of the target for the increasingly frequent and severe air raids.

The food furnished to the Eastern workers employed by Krupp was deplorable. It was the same as they gave to the Russian prisoners of war and resulted in oedema, disease and death of Eastern workers in the winter of 1942- 1943. The plant managers frequently complained of the inadequacy of the food furnished to Eastern workers. In 1942, Krupp employees protested against the inadequate food made available to the Russian civilians. The defendant Ihn received memoranda pointing out that the food was insufficient to preserve the strength of the Russian workers. Hassel, a subordinate of the defendant von Buelow said when Krupp employees protested on behalf of the Russian civilians that "one was dealing with Bolsheviks and they ought to have beatings substituted for food." The head of the Krupp Firm's hospitals reported to the defendants Ihn and Loeser that "the food supplied to the Eastern workers has been and still is insufficient. The plant managers often need two Russians to do the work of one strong normal worker." It was reported to the defendants Ihn and von Buelow that several Eastern workers suffered from hunger oedema. As shown by a survey made on 7 May 1943, four-fifths of the Eastern workers who had died at a Krupp hospital died of tuberculosis and malnutrition.

Mothers were separated from their children. At camp Voerde, babies of Eastern women were housed. Vivid descriptions have been given by defense witnesses of the pitiable condition of these most innocent victims of the cruel slave labor program. A large number of these babies died because of malnutrition. As of January 1943, 132 infants had been received at Camp Voerde. Of these 132 infants, 98 died, including 88 between August 1944 and March 1945.

Eastern workers were mistreated in many other ways. According to the defendant Ihn, from the time of the arrival of Russians, towards the end of 1941, until about 1943, they were deprived of writing or receiving letters. In 1943, they were permitted to write letters for delivery within the Reich and to send form post cards to Russia twice a month. As late as 1944, unknown to the workers, part of their outgoing and incoming mail was destroyed.

Russian workers were compelled at all times to wear a badge "Ost" ("East") and the Polish workers were compelled to wear a badge "P", in order that they might be distinguished. Failure to wear these was a cause for punishment. Even when the regulations were relaxed and the Eastern workers were permitted to go out under guard, they were not allowed to enter inns, shops, moving picture theaters, or associate with Germans or even with other foreign workers. It was the rule that escaping Russians must be shot. Those who escaped and were captured were sent to a concentration camp. They were required to work excessively long hours, and granted very few rest days. The rest they received by the Eastern workers was very little.

These workers included old men and women and children and pregnant women. 150 boys of 14 years of age, were among the first Eastern workers to arrive to work in the Krupp plant at Essen. In 1943, some of the Eastern children employed by the Krupp Firm were from twelve to seventeen years of age. In 1944, children as young as six years of age were assigned for work.

Eastern workers were beaten as part of their daily routine. The beatings took place in the Krupp plants and in the camps. The victims were beaten by the camp leaders, by the auxiliary guards, by the Werkschutz and by ordinary workers. Weapons with which they were beaten were distributed by the Krupp Firm. Although all foreign workers were subjected to mistreatment, the most severe and inhumane was that suffered by the Russian

prisoners of war and the Eastern civilian labor.

A so-called "cage" was put into operation in one of the Krupp buildings. The Werkschutz and its affiliates, the auxiliary guards, Enlarged Werkschutz I and Enlarged Werkschutz II were primarily responsible for the systematic abuse of the Eastern workers. The Werkschutz was responsible for guarding the workers in the plants and on their way to and from the camps. It administered the Eastern workers' camps until 1943, and supplied the camp leaders. It undertook the punishment of the workers within the plant and reported to the Gestapo all workers whom it considered required incarceration in a labor education camp or concentration camp. Its two auxiliary organizations, the so-called Enlarged Werkschutz I and Enlarged Werkschutz II, assisted it. The Enlarged Werkschutz I was given rooms in the Main Administration Building, just below offices belonging to the Werkschutz and in which von Buelow and his sadist subordinate, Hassel, worked. Its members lived in barracks and were given semi-military training. Its purported purpose was to quell unrest among the foreigners.

Enlarged Werkschutz II was organized in 1943. Eight persons in each shift in each plant were appointed to it. Its ostensible purpose, likewise, was to suppress riots, but the weapons furnished to it, leather truncheons, were much more suitable for flogging. Its functions were performed within the plants. As bad as the beatings were, women confined in the "cage" begged for beatings rather than to have to undergo the torture of being in the "cage".

Illustrations of just what these unfortunate Eastern workers were exposed to during the time they were forced to work for the Krupp Firm are given in the records of a case decided by the Denazification Board of Kuhnbeck on 30 October 1947, and admitted in evidence in the present case. There one Ernst Wirtz, a former Krupp guard was found guilty of "violation of international law with regard to foreign civilian workers and PW's and was sentenced to eight years imprisonment. The following acts of brutality were established: beating Eastern workers,

male and female, with a wooden board, a rubber hose, his fists; waking Eastern workers with a water hose; throwing a French civilian down a stairway; and ruthlessly beating a Russian PW with a four-edged piece of wood resulting in death from head injuries. Many of his victims required medical treatment as a result of his brutalities. Wirtz's criminal conduct lasted for four years. He testified before the Denazification Board that he was asked by the plant management to beat people, and named several others who participated in the mistreatment, including an employee of the Krupp firm named Balz. One of the others involved by Wirtz testified that "it was general knowledge in the plant that the management tried to keep up with the work discipline by the most incisive measures, that is, even with physical maltreatment." He also testified that Balz, who was "in charge" of the "plant" of the Motor Vehicle Factory and immediately subordinate to its head Roth, who reported directly to the Vorstand, did not do the beating himself, but he "instigated" others, including one Arens to do so, and that if it had been permitted, no one would have beaten the victims so brutally and that the plant managers would have done something about it. He also testified that the plant leaders sometimes watched while the people were being beaten. Wirtz, one of the many brutal employees, started in 1941 as a guard to bring the workers back and forth from work. He became a Deputy Commander of a Krupp camp in 1944. Direct knowledge of the indescribably savage treatment of these poor unfortunate workers was had by the defendants von Buedow, Ihn and Lehmann.

In Repair Workshop 2, a Russian prisoner of war was killed in such a manner as to cause acute agony. The same person upon another occasion attempted to hang a Russian whose life was saved only through the intervention of the plant manager. No action was taken against the culprit. In Foundry 5, a Russian prisoner of war was beaten to death. At the Boiler Construction Plant, a man who was in charge of guarding the Russian prisoners of war and the Eastern workers regularly abused them from the time of their arrival in 1942. Notwithstanding this, he remained in his position until shortly before the end of the war when he was transferred for his own protection because it was feared that the Russians might take revenge. The number of atrocities committed in the

plants of the Krupp Firm was such that it was a matter of common knowledge there. The defendants exposed persons to these conditions who had been illegally deported in the first place, who were kept in illegal servitude, and whom they themselves forced to manufacture the weapons to be used against their very brothers and sisters. One of the violently brutal employees of the Krupp Firm was Hassel. He has been referred to before. His mistreatment of the Eastern workers extended over the entire period of time during which they were employed at Essen. The beatings administered by him were carried out while performing his official duties. The defense has attempted to place the blame for the beating of the Eastern workers on Hassel, and have claimed that he was retained out of fear of his political connections. This claim, made upon behalf of persons as prominent and influential as many of these defendants were, is not worthy of serious consideration. But Hassel was not alone involved in the inhuman conduct, constant terrorization of thousands of workers requires more than one man. The proof is clear that the defendant von Buelow, far from seeking to discharge Hassel, secured a raise in pay for him in 1943 and said "In these recent months, Mr. Hassel was especially efficient." The beatings in the cellar were known to the members of the Werk-schutz and the Enlarged Werkschutz 2 who brought the workers in for "instruction". They were known to secretaries who were employed in the building. Could they have been unknown to these defendants whose offices were in the same building?

The defendant von Buelow was the Liaison man between the Krupp Firm and the Gestapo. He witnessed beatings of prisoners of war in the guard room at the Krupp plant, and did not interfere. After an Italian prisoner of war was beaten in the cellar of the Main Administration Building, he was taken to von Buelow's office.

The horrors of the concentration camp are well-known. The Krupp Firm was the beneficiary of these camps. The Judgment of the IMT described the use of concentration camp inmates for work as involving conditions "which made labor and death almost synonymous terms".

The Utilization of concentration camp labor for the armament program was at first restricted to employment in armament plants by the SS itself within its camps. The first change in this system was inaugurated on 16 March 1942 on the basis of conferences at Hitler's headquarters, when it was announced that concentration camps were to be used to a greater extent but only within the concentration camps themselves. Shortly thereafter, on 14 April, the defendant Erich Mueller made a proposal to Hitler for the setting up of a plant to produce automatic AA guns in a concentration camp, and the Krupp Auschwitz project was a part of this program. In September 1942, through the intercession of Hitler the employment of concentration camp labor in factories outside of cities was permitted, thus releasing other forms of labor for use inside the cities. The SS was offered a percentage share in the armament sales so that it would not sustain a loss by making its prisoners available. This program was not very successful, and very few concentration camp inmates were released for work in this way. It was finally provided that the SS should furnish information to the labor allocation authorities and armament offices concerning the allotment of concentration camp labor assigned to private firms, to avoid overlapping allocations which had previously occurred when firms obtained labor from the two agencies independently. In the early summer of 1944, the SS offered a large group of concentration camp inmates to the armament industry through the Speer Ministry. Approximately 50,000 to 60,000 so-called "Hungarian Jewesses" were made available. This labor was merely offered to industry, not allocated to it. It was not a matter of refusing to accept an allocation; it was up to the enterprises to put in requests. Many armament firms refused to request concentration camp labor for employment. The Krupp Firm sought concentration camp labor because of the scarcity of manpower in Germany then prevailing.

The first efforts of the Krupp Firm in 1942 directed at obtaining skilled labor through the concentration camps show clearly that the use of concentration camp labor was desired, and not imposed by "necessity". The defense of necessity is otherwise dealt with. However, as the activities of the Krupp Firm in procuring concentration camp labor are being dealt with here, these matters are now discussed.

On 17 September 1942, a message was sent to the Krupp Firm at Essen for the attention of the defendant Mueller, from a special committee of the Speer Ministry, requesting information as to whether or not the Krupp Firm could use skilled foreign Jewish labor, and whether it was in a position to erect a concentration camp to house them. A reply was sent by one Koettgen acting for the Krupp Firm, which stated that the employment of Jews in ammunition production was not possible, because of the requirement that Jews should work in a department by themselves, and also because cooperation of German workers with the Jews could not be expected. This reply was called to the attention of the defendants Mueller, Eberhardt, Korsch, Ihn and Lehmann, and immediately thereafter a countermanding teletype message went out to the effect that 1050 to 1100 Jewish workers could be used if they were really skilled. The significant addition was made that, "After it is finally settled whether the employment is approved by the highest authority, we shall undertake to increase this number considerably." Notice of this was also sent to the defendants Mueller, Eberhardt, Korsch, Ihn and Lehmann. Later efforts by the Krupp Firm to obtain concentration camp labor were not qualified by the requirement that such labor must be skilled.

In 1942, the defendant Erich Mueller discussed the employment of concentration camp inmates with Hitler. The report of the AK - KM Departments for 1941-1942, signed by defendants Mueller, Eberhardt and Pfirsch reads:

"The second conference on 14 April 1942 took place in order to present to the Fuehrer new models, including the Krupp anti-tank gun 41 developed on the basis of experiences in the Russian campaign of 1941.

At the same conference Dr. Mueller, on the basis of growing needs, referred to the Krupp firm's interest in starting shell production on a large scale in the Ukraine. This suggestion was gratefully accepted. Krupp is also interested in manufacturing automatic weapons in connection with a concentration camp in the Sudetengau. This project, too, has been taken up in the meantime by the Technical Office."

The week after, the defendant Mueller sent a teletype to Reiff who was employed by the Krupp Firm in a responsible position, directing him to tell Colonel Lavers of the Army Ordnance Office that, in his opinion, a factory for the manufacture of 3.7 cm anti-aircraft guns should be set up in a concentration camp. The message reads as follows:

"I should earnestly recommend to Colonel Lavers, as mentioned before, to take up the question of manufacture by Krupp in the KZ in the Sudetengau and that also for the production of the automats"

The efforts by the defendant Mueller to obtain the use of concentration camp labor were successful. However, instead of production taking place in a concentration camp in the Sudetengau, it was to be at Auschwitz in the Government General. In July, 1940, the Krupp Firm was asked by the Main Committee Armament to indicate what machine tools it would need to erect a plant to build "replacement parts for 3.7 cm anti-aircraft guns at the Auschwitz concentration camp." On 9 September 1942 the formal request to the Vorstand for approval of the necessary funds was drawn up. It stated that while the automatic weapons developed by Krupp AK Department were a complete success, "we could not carry out mass production of the 3.7 cm weapon developed by us" for lack of space, equipment and manpower.

Another firm was accordingly entrusted with mass production. The Krupp Firm, in order to retain some part in the production and in order to gain practical experience had accepted an order for supply and spare parts. In the application to the Krupp Vorstand it was also said, "We aim in this way at being able at some future date to take over the manufacture of the complete 3.7 cm automatic weapon, as automatic weapons are the weapons of the future...". In order to ensure completion of this contract a factory was to be erected at Auschwitz. The same application

to the Krupp Vorstand explicitly stated that "The concentration camp at Auschwitz will place the required manpower at our disposal."

The proposal was for an allowance of two million marks; this was approved by the defendants Loeser and Krupp, and the approval of it was signed by them. A conference was had in December 1942, and additional plans were made to prepare for production. The defendant Eberhardt was to prepare an agreement with the SS. The buildings which were to be constructed by the SS at Auschwitz were expected to be ready by March, 1943. On 5 March 1943, Essen was very heavily bombed and it was necessary to evacuate large portions of the plant. At a conference on 8 March 1943 concerning evacuation plans, attended by defendants Loeser, Alfried Krupp, Houdremont, Korschach, Erich Mueller and Pfirsch, the following decision was made with regard to Auschwitz:

"Auschwitz

"The production of 3.7 cm Flack parts has apparently been dropped. A workshop building will soon be available there with a floor space of 14,000 square meters without cranes. This building is to be planned for the production of: a) Aircraft fittings, b) A new fuse workshop, to replace the fuseshop in Essen that was burned out."

Minutes of the meeting were distributed to the defendant Eberhardt as well as those attending the meeting.

A special conference was held on 11 March 1943 to discuss the extent of the damage done to the Fuse plant by bombing. This conference was attended by the defendants Houdremont, Korschach, Mueller, Eberhardt and several of their subordinates from the technical office, KM Department and Fuse Production Departments. After discussing the possibility of salvaging some equipment of the bombed fuse plant, the plan to resume production on a large scale at Auschwitz was discussed and Reiff was authorized to submit this plan to the competent government officials. This was communicated to the latter by the Krupp-Berlin office.

The plan was approved, and a confirmation of it in the form of a government order for 100,000 fuses was sent to the defendant Janssent in Berlin by the Army Ordnance Office. Later on plans were made for the transfer of skilled inmate labor to the fuse production program. In the meantime, it was not possible to start production immediately. The transportation and repair of machines took time, and when it was suggested to a Krupp employee by an Army official that for several reasons only German workers should be used in the initial stages of production, the Krupp employee protested "that the main purpose of evacuating the plant to Auschwitz had been to employ the people there." This employee, Weinhold, feeling that the Krupp Firm might lose some of the advantages to be had by operating a plant at Auschwitz, wrote a file note to his superior, the defendant Kolschan. Notice of this was sent to the defendants Mueller and Eberhardt. In the file note Weinhold said,

"Up to now it was always supposed that the supply of workers in Auschwitz is unlimited as regards quality and quantity. It might therefore happen in case of a belated start of production that the whole reason why we accepted the unusual difficulties which are present at Auschwitz, namely the free disposal over workers will no longer exist * * *"

In June 1943, the Krupp Firm started to employ concentration camp inmates at Auschwitz. By the end of the month approximately 160 were actually working for the firm there. By the middle of July, 50 persons were engaged in the manufacture of equipment and tools, and another 150 on repairs and installation of machinery.

In September, 270 persons were employed, and it was contemplated that by the end of the year 600 to 650 people

could be used.

These persons were of many nationalities, including Poles, Frenchmen, Czechs and Dutchmen. The majority were of the Jewish religion. Many were in very poor physical condition. They were beaten and otherwise punished by SS guards and "Kapos", fellow inmates charged by the SS with the responsibility for disciplining them. The food furnished to them was meager, insufficient in both volume and nutrition value. Some of the German workers attempted surreptitiously to give them a little food.

The failure of the Krupp Firm to obtain the necessary machinery to start full-scale production caused incriminations on the part of the SS. They advised the Krupp Firm that unless the necessary machinery was brought in, the shops would have to be turned over to other firms. The Krupp Firm promised and endeavored to obtain the necessary machinery. The complaints about the Firm's inability to get production started were brought to the attention of the defendant Houdremont. Assurances were given that production was imminent, and that full-scale production, employing between 600 and 650 persons could be expected by the end of the year. The defendant Krupp wrote a letter to the Army Ordinance Office assuring that, despite many obstacles, satisfactory production of fuses could be expected to commence within a short time.

Before full-scale production could be had, however, the offensive of the Russian Army had made unexpected progress. Reiff wrote to his superiors, the defendants Korsch, Mueller and Eberhardt, that in his conversation with a representative of the Army High Command, "I immediately discarded any thought of giving up Auschwitz; I reserved any further decision until I could think things over." The Krupp Firm, however, was forced to give up

the plant at Auschwitz, and the machinery was shipped westwards to the Berthawerke, where production was finally accomplished. The facts connected with Auschwitz clearly show not only the use of concentration camp labor, but also the desire to do so. They permit no opportunity for the conclusion that this labor was forced upon the Krupp firm.

The facts connected with the Berthawerke lead only to the same conclusion. Here again, it was not only known that concentration camp labor would necessarily be required to fulfill the program, but the fact of availability of such labor was used as a means for expansion. Among the projects for which compulsory labor camps were set up was the construction of the Krupp Berthawerke plant at Markstaedt, near Breslau.

In July 1942, when the effort by government agencies and industry representatives for discontinuance of the Markstaedt project for light field howitzers had become formidable, Reiff prepared a memorandum for leading Krupp officials, including the defendants Krupp, Mueller and Eberhardt, describing the discussions of this problem at a meeting presided over by Saur. Attached was an appendix containing the arguments in favor of continuing the project.

It contained the following:

"The construction job is being carried out in particularly favorable conditions. The majority of the construction workers are prison-inmates and Jews in punitive detention; 1200 men have already been gathered in one camp there. The camp capacity is approximately 2,000 men. In addition an adequate number of construction workers will be made available by the SS so that the construction will be carried out with the greatest possible speed."

In September, 1942, after Hitler had prevented the abandonment of the Markstaedt project, the defendant Mueller attempted to induce the Navy to approve the inclusion of

a large Navy expansion project at Markstaedt for the furnishing of heavy naval guns and armor plate. In this connection, he used the following argument:

"In this respect it appears to me propitious that presently a partial construction project for the army is already under way which might be completed in the next spring as far as mere construction goes. It is advisable to leave the building details of organization Todt on the spot which are now carrying out these constructions and to start then right away with building the Navy shops. This will presumably be facilitated by the fact that the manpower employed on the present building job is not a domestic one (mostly Jews) thus precluding the freezing of valuable German manpower."

The labor used for the construction of the Krupp-owned Berthawerke consisted almost entirely of imprisoned Jewish labor, deported from the so-called Government General in Poland. They were guarded by the Wehrmacht. They worked for building contracting firms under the supervision of the Plenipotentiary for Building Construction in the Speer Ministry. About 4,000 of them were assigned to the construction of the Krupp plant by July 1943. Because of the needs for this labor on the construction work, it was decided that the labor could not be transferred to production at that time.

The monthly report of Berthawerke A.G. to its Supervisory Board in Essen for November 1943 reported that "Serious labor losses are threatened for the building sector owing to the withdrawal of the Jews". In the report for the following month it was possible to report that:

"As a result of negotiations with the Security Main Office (Sicherheitshauptamt) approval was obtained for continuing to keep the Jews in the building sector for the time being, without transferring them to concentration camps as originally had been proposed for the Jews of the building sector."

The Direktorium of Fried. Krupp in Essen applied to the Reich Association Iron (RVE) for approval of a plan

for the starting of construction on a steel works at Markstaedt. In the application it was stated in referring to the sources of manpower available "before long 3,300 Jews who are working on the spot as building workers can be released for the above-mentioned work."

In the monthly report of Berthawerke A.G. to the Aufsichtsrat in Essen for the month of March 1944, the following appears:

"Armament Development Speer.

In spite of our urgent remonstrances Herr Ewald of the Armament Development (Ruestungsausbau) Speer declared, that no partial accounts on the work of the armament development already completed could be given due to lack of personnel. In order to prevent a transfer of the Jews who work with the Speer building management the Bertha Works negotiated for having the Jews put in the concentration camp Fuenfteichen. Thereby a better supervision of the allocation of labor (of the Jews) can be achieved in future. Construction work outside of the plant compound was temporarily endangered by these measures. However, by internal plant regulations and through negotiations with the building management Speer the question could essentially be cleared up."

In this report it was stated that interruption in the construction of a hospital was reported "because some of the Jews employed as building laborers were, as mentioned above, transferred to the concentration camp." This hospital was built and construction labor was supervised by the Krupp Firm itself and not by the Speer Ministry construction staff.

Again, in the monthly report of the Berthawerke for July 1944 reference is made to negotiations which took place with the armament command concerning the use of 500 Jews for track-laying on the firing range. The defendant Korschach attended a conference at which the urgent need for labor was discussed. In a memorandum to the defendant Mueller, Reiff stated, "In advising that the Army Ordinance Office did not make labor available

for the Krupp light field howitzer program", but that he was confident that he could obtain the necessary labor. He said; "a concentration camp for 4,000 inmates is being constructed. The completion of this camp and the procurement of the inmates should be speeded up particularly;"

At a discussion with Mueller. The need for a decision as to "whether possibly Jews from the building sector and, in general, concentration camp inmates, should be employed in greater numbers in the workshops," was discussed. At a meeting on 26 August 1944 at Berthawerke, attended by the defendants Mueller and Korschach, the question of labor for production was discussed, and it was suggested that a certain reserve should be observed in putting concentration camp inmates at the disposal of the plant. The defendant Mueller urgently recommended the use of this possibility. Minutes of this meeting were distributed to defendants Pfirsch, Eberhardt and Ihn.

In a letter dated 31 August 1944 from Berthawerk to the Krupp Vorstand in Essen, the labor problem was presented to the Vorstand. The labor needs were listed, and it was stated that approximately 6,000 workers would have to be furnished from the regional labor office and from concentration camps. In the letter, the necessity of acting quickly was emphasized, because of the possibility that if work shops were not fully utilized, visiting officials "might conceived the idea of bringing outside firms into our workshops." The letter was signed by defendant Korschach and also by Reiff. It was addressed to defendant Krupp, chairman of the Vorstand, through defendant Mueller, and was circularized to defendants Janssen, Houdremont and Ihn before a discussion of the Vorstand meeting.

Defendant Mueller promised to give the views expressed extensive support. When the Vorstand gave its approval to the utilization of concentration camp labor, Reiff contacted the WVHA (the SS Main Economic Administration) to negotiate for the allocation of concentration camp labor. The matter was referred to the concentration camp "Gross Rosen". At a conference at Berthawerke with SS representatives of this concentration camp, plans were made to equip the branch camp at Fuenfteichen for the inmates as rapidly as possible so as to accommodate 800 by 10 October 1943, 2300 by 15 October and 4,000, including guards by 1 December 1943. The work was to be performed by inmates of the camp. Minutes of this meeting were distributed to defendants Korschan, Houdremont, Mueller and Ihn.

The desire for a large project at Markstaedt was so great that the Krupp Firm was willing to, and did spend, up to November 30, 1943, 69,400,00 RM as shown by the monthly report of the Berthawerke, A.G. for the month of November, 1943. This report was signed by the defendant Korschan, was marked "confidential" and was sent to the defendant Krupp. Copies were also sent to the defendants Mueller, Houdremont, Janssen, Eberhardt and Ihn. The report contained the following:

	Expenditure up to 31 Oct. 1943	Expenditure in November	Expenditure up to 30 Nov. 1943
Real estate	2,- Million	0,2 Million	2,2 Million
Payments in advance	"		
Organ. Speer	25,- "	---- "	25,- "
Machines and inventory			15,3
a) payment	14,7 "	1,1 - "	15,8 "
b) payment down	3,2 "	1, "	4,2 "
starting and operating costs	19,5 "	2,7 "	22,2 "
	64,4 million	5,- Million	69,4 Million

This expenditure was covered as follows:

Use of that part of the share-capital at present paid
in to the amount of RM 28,750 million

Part payment made from credit
granted by Heeresruestungskredit
A.G. to the amount of RM 20,000 million
was likewise completely used up;

the balance of the amount needed
was covered by means of a deposit
loan with Fried. Krupp A.G.; the
balance which our account owes
Fried. Krupp A.G.-according to
the vouchers which reached us-
amounts to approximately

RM 20,650 million

RM 69,400 million

In a letter written by the defendant Krupp, on or
about 18 January 1944, he stated that thereafter the
defendant Korschach would be chairman of the Berthawerke
Vorstand.

By the end of October, there were almost 600 concen-
tration camp inmates in the production labor force. In
November the number increased to 685 and to 890 by
December. In its application to a government agency, dated
2 February 1944 for the construction of a steel factory at
Markstaedt, the Krupp Firm gave as one of the reasons for
approving the new construction the following:

"The chief thing is that there is a concentration
camp ready to receive 4000 to 5000 concentration
camp internees. At present this is occupied by
only 1200 men."

It was pointed out that the use of concentration
camp labor is feasible because of the outlying position
of the steel works and that operations could be started
within one year after permission was granted. It was
pointed out also that these things could not be done "unless,
in addition to the building workers available at Markstaedt,
concentration camp internees to the extent of about 1000
men are provided." A companion application filed the same
day for construction of a rolling mill referred to the
availability of concentration camp labor "as mentioned

in connection with the steel works."

In April 1944, when the Krupp Firm had regained control over all phases of production, 1,668 concentration camp inmates were employed at Berthawerke. By July of that year, the number had increased to 2,610. In October of that year, Bernard Weiss of the Flick Firm estimated on his visit to Berthawerke, that approximately 1/2 of the total labor force of 12,000 consisted of concentration camp inmates.

After the SS Commandant at Gross-Rosen complained because of Krupp's failure to cooperate fully, the defendant Houdremont agreed to make a trip to Berthawerke in the near future to clear up the matter, and he instructed a member of the Berthawerke staff to keep in very close touch with the SS so that difficulties would be straightened out as they arose. The defendant Korschach, at the request of the defendant Houdremont, investigated the differences of opinion between the Berthawerke staff and the SS concentration camp administration at Fuenfteichen, and reported in detail to the defendant Houdremont on these matters a few days later.

The first group of concentration camp inmates used in the production program at Berthawerke were inspected at the camp "Gross-Rosen" before being sent to the special camp at Fuenfteichen by Krupp employees of the firm's Labor Allocation Department. They were in a bad state of health, and some of them could not walk at all without aid, so that when going to and from work, they had to be supported by fellow-workers. It took them 50 minutes to walk from the camp to work in the Berthawerke shops in the footgear furnished by the SS, consisting of either broken wooden clogs, or rags wrapped around the feet. The inmates worked without any morning meal, and for

twelve hours with only one bowl of soup, which they received at noon. Their food was so poor that they sought food remains, and begged for scraps of food. They fought each other for the left-over soup, which the other foreign workers had left or rejected despite the limited amount of food made available to them. A doctor employed by the Krupp Firm who observed the poor appearance of the concentration camp inmates employed, reported that:

"In spite of all efforts we could not change in detail the system of the work to be done by the concentration camp detainees, which was really responsible for the bad state of the detainees."

Notwithstanding the very poor health and the weakness of the concentration camp inmates, they had to continue to work and to produce armaments for the Krupp Firm. An illustration of the mistreatment of these unfortunate concentration camp inmates while working in the Berthawerke, is contained in the testimony of a Czech worker. This, in part, is as follows:

"Q. Can you say who beat these people, who beat these Jews and for what reasons?

"A. Yes, I can say that. For instance, at lunch time when soup was distributed during lunch to the Jews, the Jews pressed forward with their cups. The person who distributed the soup pushed the Jews back or beat them, or he told the guard who stood there to beat the Jews. That soldier then hit the Jews with the butt of his rifle."

The inmates were also beaten because they did not properly perform the work to which they were assigned, as a result of not knowing how to work the machines. The beatings administered to them by the supervisors was with a whip made of iron with rubber. Conferences were had between the competent plant managers and the members of the SS during which the matter of punishing the concentration camp inmates was discussed.

The housing furnished to the concentration camp inmates was most inadequate, and the lives of the inmates were in danger as the plant was not furnished with proper air raid shelters for the workers. During air raids, the concentration camp inmates had to remain in the plant while other employees were permitted to leave it.

The situation at the Berthawerke again leads to the conclusion that the Krupp Firm planned its own program upon its desire to use concentration camp labor.

After the production of fuses at Auschwitz had been taken away from the Krupp Firm, immediate efforts were made to select a new site for the production of fuses by the firm. The advantage of having allotted to it the use of a concentration camp near Lublin because of the immediate availability of labor was considered. At a conference of Krupp personnel in the Artillery Development Office attended by the defendants Houdremont and Eberhardt, the possibility of locating the fuse production plant at Wuestegiersdorf in Silesia was discussed and considered. Production of fuses there was taken up and approximately 200 female concentration camp workers were assigned in the summer of 1944. All of these concentration camp inmates were Jewish. They were of Hungarian or Yugoslavian nationality. These women were not allocated by the local labor office; they were procured as a result of negotiations carried on by Weinhold and other plant leaders of the Krupp Firm with the SS.

The work shops used for the production of mining machinery at the Gusstahlfabrik in Essen were destroyed in 1943, and thereafter a transferred plant was established at Geisenheim on the Rhine. Later, the production of breeches for anti-aircraft guns was also transferred to this plant. In the summer of 1944, the management of the Geisenheim plant had advised the defendant Eberhardt who was responsible for its supervision, that they

desired concentration camp labor as such workers were then being made available by the SS to the armament industry. The defendant Eberhardt consulted with the defendant Janssen, his superior, on this matter, and thereafter approved an application for such allocation by the Geisenheim management.

On July 5, 1944, a conference was held in the office of the defendant Ihn concerning the use of concentration camp labor. Concentration camp workers consisting of Hungarian and Polish women of the Jewish faith were employed at the Krupp Geisenheim plant until March, 1945, when they were taken to the interior of Germany, in view of the advance of the Allied troops into that area.

Despite of the shortage of labor at the Elmag plant, as a result of which difficulty was had in meeting production schedules for military tractors, efforts were unsuccessfully made to obtain orders for the production of Tatra motors, designed by another firm. The competent government official indicated that he preferred to give orders to firms who had labor available, rather than to a plant where a great many workers were still needed. A Krupp representative at Berlin sent a teletype to Elmag that he had succeeded in obtaining the approval of one of the members of the Main Committee of Motors, for the production of T motors by the Elmag plant. The teletype was transmitted to the defendant Eberhardt. It was as follows:

"So Herr Schnieders asks us to treat the whole matter but above all his discussion with Herr Vorwig as confidential in order not to annoy the Main Committee. The labor question connected with the motor problem was also mentioned. Herr Schnieders has contacted Oranienburg concerning concentration camp inmates and he will give more detailed information to-morrow."

Two days later, defendant Eberhardt received another teletype from Elmag on the machinery needs and the labor requirements for the production of T Motors. The labor needs were estimated at 1250 workers, to be furnished by the use of concentration camp inmates. Some concentration camp inmates did arrive at Elmag. They were to construct a concentration camp within the plant grounds to accommodate over 1000 workers. These concentration camp inmates did not remain long at Elmag. The monthly report for August 1944, sent to defendant Eberhardt and copies of which were sent to defendants Krupp, Houdremont, Mueller and Janssen noted that, "for security reasons the first contingent of KZ inmates allotted to us was again removed from the factory. The KZ operation has been stopped." At that time, the Allied troops were approaching the city.

Two months later, the plant known as Krupp Krawa was evacuated from Alsace to Germany and reestablished in Nuernberg and Kulmbach as the Suedwerke. On 14 December 1944, defendant Eberhardt made a record in his notes of a meeting with the management of Suedwerke that "the Suedwerke hoped to be allocated 1250 concentration camp prisoners." A month later, the Director of Suedwerke, Hupe, was arranging for billeting the SS guards for concentration camp inmates at Kulmbach. In the summer of 1944, defendant Ihn, after consulting with the Direktorium, sent defendant Lehmann to the offices of the WHVA (the SS Main Economic Administration) at Oranienburg, to arrange for the allocation of concentration camp inmates to the Krupp Firm in Essen. Lehmann reported that at Oranienburg he was informed that concentration camp Buchenwald

was the camp to which they should apply, and that they should get in touch with that camp.

The defendants Ihn and Lehmann started negotiations immediately with the commander of the Buchenwald concentration camp. They were joined at various times at conferences by the defendant Houdremont during the course of these negotiations. The defendants Krupp, Houdremont Janssen, Mueller and Eberhardt were informed of the progress of the subsequent negotiations.

Pister, the commander of the Buchenwald concentration camp, visited the Krupp firm at Essen on the fourth and fifth of July 1944, to discuss the request for 2000 concentration camp inmates made by the Krupp firm. He advised the Krupp representatives that he could allocate 2000 female concentration camp inmates to them. They discussed the question of getting 2000 male concentration camp inmates. Pister approved the selection by the Krupp Firm of the camp at Humboldtstrasse which was then being used for the confinement of Italian Military Internees, upon the condition that Krupp would provide the inmates with street car transportation to and from the place of work because of the very poor footwear of the inmates. Krupp's firm was to pay the sum of 4 RM per day to the SS for the use of this labor - it must be added here that concentration camp workers received no pay at all - and was to furnish blankets, eating utensils and work clothes for dirty labor. Also it was agreed between Pister and the defendant Aupke that the Main Camp Administration of the Krupp Firm assumed the responsibility for furnishing food and food preparation, whereas the guard personnel, administrative staff and medical personnel was to be furnished by the SS.

Shortly thereafter, the SS advised the Krupp Firm that only female concentration camp inmates could be furnished. One Troeckel, a subordinate of defendant Lehmann in Labor Allocation "A" was dispatched by defendant Ihn to a factory at Gelsenberg where 2,000 female concentration

camp inmates were employed to look over the workers. Troeckel reported thereafter that, in his judgment, the women were unsuitable since they appeared too frail and weak for heavy work. On 26 July 1944, Schwarz, a representative of the commander of the Buchenwald concentration camp visited the Krupp Firm at Essen to discuss the employing of female concentration camp inmates. Schwarz stated that the camp was too spacious, and for security reasons, only five barracks and a few slit trenches should be wired off to form the camp. He also inspected the plants in which the Krupp Firm had planned to use concentration camp labor, and approved only Rolling Mill II and the Electrode shop as meeting the standards of the SS for segregation of the foreign workers. As not less than 500 women would be assigned by the SS, the Krupp firm agreed to take this number. Steps were taken within the Krupp administration to use them in accordance with security requirement of the SS. As part of the agreement, the Krupp firm was to furnish the names of German women who would be sworn in to the SS and given 3 weeks training at the women's concentration camp at Ravensbrueck and then assigned as guards for these concentration camp inmates. The Krupp Firm recruited these guards within its own organization. Some difficulty was encountered and the plants were circularized to obtain the full quota. The names were finally obtained through recruitment in the Krupp plants and as a result of the efforts of the Krupp personnel office. These women were to have special training in the diabolical methods of the SS,

Krupp employees, including one from Labor Allocation "A" and plant leaders of the shops in which the concentration camp inmates were to be employed, went to Gelsenberg and selected 520 women from the 2,000 available there for employment at Krupp. Final negotiations for the allocation of this labor and transportation to Essen were made by the defendant Lehmann and his subordinates.

blanket was furnished by the Krupp firm. This the girls had to use, not only as their sole item of bedding, but also to protect them against the cold and rain during the long marches to and from the plant and while at work. Washing facilities were no longer available, and practically no sanitary facilities were available at the camp. These conditions continued until March 1945, when the girls were evacuated from Essen. Although these conditions were known to all responsible parties, no efforts were made to provide other accommodations or to rebuild any of the buildings within the camp.

Only one meal was served each day at the camp. It was served to the day shift after they returned to the plant, and to the night shift before their departure to the plant. The meal consisted of soup and bread, supplemented with margarine or marmalade. One occasion the authorities at the Buchenwald concentration camp instituted an inquiry as to the failure of the Krupp Firm to furnish the sugar which it should have provided to the prisoners. A plant meal, called "bunker soup" was given at about noon time to the day shift workers during the first few weeks. After the heavy air raids in October 1944, Plant meals were no longer furnished. No supplementary ration was ever given to the night shift workers. Some of the German employees, out of pity for the "Hungarian Jewesses" because of the insufficiency of food, surreptitiously gave some to them.

The SS furnished coats with distinguishing colored patches to the girls. Torn pieces of blankets were wrapped around the feet and legs of some of the girls. Inmates were required at times to walk barefooted, as many of them possessed neither stockings nor foot rags, and there were numerous cases of frozen feet and chilblains. Some of these girls were required to carry bricks and metal sheets without gloves or other protection.

Because of the requirements prescribed by the SS in permitting the employment of concentration camp inmates by the Krupp Firm, the latter arranged with the Essen street railway company for open "summer" cars for transportation between the camp and the plants.

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This transportation was furnished until 23 October 1944 when the particular line used was destroyed in an air raid. After that, the inmates marched to work under guard through the streets of Essen. The largest number of girls were employed in Rolling Mill #2. This was at least a mile and a half from the camp. The girls were awakened at four o'clock in the morning. A roll call was had at 4:30 A.M. They started work at 6:00 A.M. and the working hours were long for both the day shift and the night shift. On Sunday, the working hours were shorter.

After production in many of the Krupp plants at Essen was prevented because of air raids, the concentration camp inmates were put to work in moving rubble and carrying building material for the reconstruction of the plant. The principle task was the carrying of bricks and iron roofing sheets. The women SS "supervisors" slapped and kicked the girls if they slowed down in their work. They were deprived of food as punishment, and their hair was closely cropped or shaved in the form of a cross. The selection of work, the amount of work and the supervision of it was decided by the Krupp Firm. The plant leaders and foremen fixed the work tasks. Work discipline was enforced by Krupp supervisors and by their giving instruction for punishment to the SS "supervisors". The mistreatment of these girls was a matter of common knowledge in the firm.

At Rolling Mill II, where many of them were employed, a room was made available to them as an air raid shelter. They were not permitted to use the shelter to which all German personnel went during air raids, except on a few occasions at night when the size of the staff was reduced.

In February 1945, a subordinate of the defendant Lehmann in Labor Allocation A learned that the SS did not plan to permit the concentration camp inmates to remain alive and thus be liberated by the advancing American troops. He advised his superior, the defendant Lehmann of this plan, and also the members of the

Direktorium. After a discussion of this matter by the Direktorium, defendant Janssen advised defendants Ihn and Lehmann of the decision of the members of that body to have these concentration camp prisoners removed from Essen. Defendant Ihn then directed defendant Lehmann to arrange for their shipment back to Buchenwald. Lehmann ordered a member of his staff to assist in providing a train for the shipment of these girls back to Buchenwald. On 17 March 1945, the girls were marched to Bochum. There a train was made up for them and 1,500 male concentration camp inmates. They were shipped eastward under SS guards. With the exception of a few who had escaped shortly before -- and two of them, the sisters Roth, were able to appear as witnesses before this Tribunal --, nothing further has been discovered about the fate of the young "Hungarian Jewesses" of the Krupp Firm.

The 520 female concentration camp inmates ranged in age from 15 to 25 years. Some of them were students. They were members of the Jewish faith and because of their religion had been selected and forcibly removed in May 1944, together with their families, from their homes in Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Hungary, and transported to the infamous Auschwitz concentration camp in Poland. The Czechs, about 50% of the total of 520, had lived in the area of Czechoslovakia which was turned over to Hungary by Germany after its occupation of Czechoslovakia. At Auschwitz, they were stripped of all their possessions and their clothing was replaced by a single issue of sack-like grey garments made of burlap and wooden clogs with fabric tops. Parts of their heads were shaved. Many of their family members were gassed in Auschwitz. From Auschwitz, the women were shipped to a camp at Gelsenberg, a short distance from Essen, which was under the control of the commander of the Buchenwald concentration camp. Here the Krupp officials selected the 520 inmates shipped to Essen. They were referred to as "Hungarian Jewesses".

The camp at Humboldtstrasse used for housing these concentration camp inmates consisted of four sleeping barracks, and a building referred to as the kitchen in which food was served and eaten by the inmates. The camp also included an air raid trench which was designed to protect the inhabitants against fragments and splinters but was completely without value as a protection against heavy bombs. The camp was surrounded by barbed wire, and guarded by guard towers manned by members of the SS, to prevent the inmates from escaping.

The barracks were burned down in an air raid on 25 October 1944. The former kitchen building was patched, and the entire population was then crowded into this building where they lived, notwithstanding the fact that rain leaked in. The inmates slept upon a little straw

on the floor. The washroom facilities were destroyed and not replaced. During another air raid on 31 December 1944, this building was hit, and thereafter the entire population lived in the cellar of this bombed out building where it was damp and cold and ventilation was poor. Stoves could not be used. The inmates carried planks to the cellar and spread insufficient straw on the planks. They did not have two blankets per person as prescribed by the SS. Only one

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