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H. Eastern Workers

1. 1. Introduction

Civilians from Poland and Russia were first brought to Essen in large numbers in 1942. On January, 1942 the Gusstahlfabrik employed five Russians and sixty-seven Poles. By April, 1942 the number had risen to 319 Russians and 462 Poles and by the end of the year the Gusstahlfabrik employed 5,787 Russians and 1,046 Poles. DX 932, Ihn 130, Bk. 12, pp. 95, 101. The number of Russian and Polish employees dropped sharply after the air raids in March 1943. Russian and Polish labor, however, continued to represent approximately thirty percent of the total foreign labor strength until the end of the war. In October 1944, when all production virtually came to a standstill at Essen, 3,535 Russians were employed and 1,210 Polish workers. (Ibid). The decline in the number of Eastern workers from 1943 until the end of the war was, in part, the product of the fact that the evacuated sections of the Gusstahlfabrik, as, for example, Elmag, took with them the Russian workers which they employed. PX 1330, NIK-11914, Bk. 53, p. 118.

Eastern workers were employed not only at the Gusstahlfabrik, but in the various subsidiaries of Fried. Krupp. Alfried Krupp concedes that fifty percent of the employees of the Krupp coal mines were foreign workers, of whom eighty percent were Eastern workers. (PX 1247, NIK-11231, Bk. 44, p. 18, 27). Eastern workers were also employed at Elmag and at the Suedwerke at Bamberg. (PX 1336, NIK-8904, Bk. 53, p. 133; PX 1342, NIK-8905, Bk. 53, pp. 196, 198); at the Berthawerke (PX 1117, NIK-7248, Bk. 41A, p. 88; PX 1128, NIK-12339, Bk. 41A, p. 92);

at the Friedrich Alfred Huetten (DX 1307, Hou 215, Bk. 2, p. 19) and at the Germaniawerke DX 2838, Ihn 952, Bk. 17, p. 62; DX 2839, Ihn 992, Bk. 17, p. 82.

The Eastern workers were brought to Germany in 1942 for only one purpose, to increase Germany's military potential. "The armament and nutrition tasks" Sauckel wrote in April 1942, "make it vitally necessary not only to include the entire German labor power but also to call on foreign labor. *** The greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of the East. Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription or forced labor". PX 834, O16-PS, Bk. 31, pp. 45, 50, quoted in the Judgment of the IMT, p. 247.

Krupp immediately requested its share of this man power to be made available by "this new gigantic labor mobilization". ibid. On 1 July 1942 it had pending a request for 8,919 workers, although it had received 6,844 workers, including 3,139 Russians, during the preceding two months. To secure recognition of its demands Krupp dealt directly with Nicolai, who was Schmelter's predecessor in the Ministry for Armament and Munition. It advised him that there were no "substantial difficulties concerning billeting" and complained that the allocations to them had been insufficient. In consequence, Nicolai directed Sauckel's agency, the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation, "to allocate to firm Krupp 3-4,000 more workers in entire convoys from those Russian civilian workers presently arriving in Defense District VI" PX 1558, NIK-15513, R. Bk. 3, pp. 3,4; PX 1559, NIK-15500, R. Bk. 3, p. 5;

PX 1560, NIK-15503, R. Bk. 3, p. 6; PX 1561, NIK-15514, R. Bk. 3, p. 7. The success of their efforts is reflected in the employment figures quoted earlier.

Upon their arrival in Essen the Eastern workers were allocated to every part of the Gusstahlfabrik. A cost study done in November 1942 shows Eastern workers employed in every principal subdivision of the Essen plants, including the Foundries (Giesereien), Rolling Mills (Walzwerke) and Forges (Schmiedebetriebe) which, as part of the "Steel Plants" were at that time subordinate to Korsch, (PX 48, NIK-8981, Bk. 3, pp. 41, 47), the "Machine Plants" (mech. Betriebe) and General Machine Construction (Allgemeiner Maschinenbau) where finished armaments were made and the Locomotive Plant, DX 528, Ihn 124, Bk. 12, p. 78, 91-93. The latter shops, as part of the "Machinery Plant" were made subordinate to Erich Mueller after the reorganization of the Vorstand in March 1943. At the same time Houdremont, who had previously been Korsch's deputy, took over the Foundries, including the "Steel Plants" formerly under the supervision of Korsch, DX 2719, Kor. 152, Bk. 7, p. 12. Eastern workers continued to be employed in every branch of the Gusstahlfabrik until the capitulation. (See Lehmann Books 13-15).

With the exception of concentration camp victims and the inmates of "labor education camps" the Eastern workers and their compatriots, the Russian prisoners of war were the worst treated of all classes of foreign labor in Germany. When they arrived in Germany they were put behind barbed wire in foul camps; they were brought back and forth to work under guard; they could not leave their camps except on alternate Sundays when particularly deserving workers were allowed to take walks under the supervision of a German guard; they were

compelled to wear a badge to distinguish them from their masters; they were fed miserably, worked hard and paid little. Although time ameliorated some of these conditions, others remained unchanged, or even deteriorated. Until the end of the war they remained the worst paid, fed and housed of all foreign labor. To say, as does Defense Counsel, that the "decree of March 25, 1944 practically placed the Eastern workers on the same footing as other labor" (Final Plea of Otto Kranzbuehler, p. 43) is to fly in the face of the facts. The deaths at Camp Voerde, the complaints of Fuehrer against the Eastern workers' rations, the abuses in Armor Construction 4, to name but a few items, took place subsequent to March 1944. From the beginning to the end of the war the treatment of the Eastern workers was inhumane. As Defense Counsel points out, it was the direct product of Nazi ideology which regarded the " 'Eastern Men' as an inferior race not entitled to the same treatment as other men" (id. p. 43). Only by accepting the same premises can it be defended.

2. Deportation and Enslavement

Whatever camouflage may have been maintained as to the voluntary character of the Western workers, no attempt was made to conceal or deny the fact that the Eastern workers had been brought to Germany as prisoners. On the contrary, this was their declared status. Ihn so advised all the works managers on 13 March 1942, "The Russian civilian workers are to be treated in the same way as prisoners of war", (PX 1228, NIK-6115, Bk.43 p. 68). Nor was there any pretense that any contract existed between the Russian workers and the management. Ihn, on 29 November 1943, in directing the compulsory extension of the "contracts" of the French, Dutch and Belgian workers, reminded the plant managers that this was not necessary in the case of Eastern workers since "Eastern workers and Poles are subject to obligatory service for an unlimited period". PX 950, NIK-10671, Bk.34, p.87).

From the time of their arrival the Eastern workers were kept under guard behind barbed wire. The defendants, therefore, are only conceding the obvious when they admit:

"With regard to the Eastern laborers (Russian and Ukrainians) assigned to us for work, it was completely obvious to me that these workers did not come voluntarily, but that they had been forcibly brought to Essen by Reich organizations".

(Aff. of Kpk, PX 893, NIK-10764, Bk.33, p. 37).

"As for the Soviet workers (Russian civilian workers) it was my opinion from the outset that at least a large part of them were not voluntary personnel. I came to this conclusion particularly from the manner in which these people arrived (under guard) and from the fact that they constantly remained under guard ***. As I see it, other authoritative persons from Krupp must also have seen clearly that at least a large part of these Russian civilian workers were involuntary personnel. By these other authoritative persons, I mean those whose full time job was concerned with labor allocation".

(Aff. of Loe, PX 1248, NIK-3283, Bk.44, pp.27, 34-35).

"After a certain time at least, it was clear to everyone that the Russian civilian workers were not voluntary workers in the true sense of the word * * *".

(Aff. of Krupp, PX 1247, NIK-11231, Bk. 44, pp. 18, 19)

See also Testimony of Erich Blume, Tr. pp. 8803, 8804.

3. Imprisonment

From the time of their arrival in Essen until their liberation the Eastern workers were treated like prisoners. Their camps were fenced in and they were brought back and forth to work under guard. Initially, only a small percentage were permitted to leave the camp on alternate Sundays under the surveillance of a German guard. In 1943 this rule was relaxed and any Eastern worker who could obtain a pass from the camp management was allowed to be out until dusk. Later even this limited privilege was apparently revoked.

Ernst Amman, director of the Widia plant, testified as follows under examination by the Court as to the manner in which Eastern workers employed at his plant were brought back and forth to work each day:

"Q. What was the distance from the place where they worked to the factory?

A. It was about half a minutes walk.

Q. Were they marched from the work to their quarters in a body?

A. Yes.

Q. Then going to and from the plant to their quarters, were they under guard?

A. No.

Q. There were no guards at all, they were not under guard at any time?

A. No, there were no guards at all. There were only German colleagues who took them to the camp and collected them from there."

Tr. pp. 1449-1450).

"I said that the male workers, the male Eastern workers which had to go back to the school, were escorted by volunteers among the German colleagues, and that they were taken back from the school again."

Q. Well, then, they marched in a body to and from?

A. Yes, in a group. I wouldn't call it a column, that's going a little bit too far".

(Tr. p. 1462).

His testimony is supported by other evidence, PX. 849, NIK-9031, Bk. 32, p. 4. The requirement that the Eastern workers be brought back and forth from work under guard was never relaxed. In October 1943, more than a year after the Eastern workers had arrived in Essen, Ihn sent a circular to the plants reminding them of the regulations.

"3. Eastern Workers.

The Eastern workers also have to be taken to and from work by guards provided from the ranks of the plant complement. Exceptions can be made only if the plant has at its disposal reliable and trustworthy Eastern workers who can be appointed "troop leaders". Such applications in triplicate indicating the plant, the number of Eastern workers suggested for each troupe, and the name of the troop leaders and his proposed deputy will be directed to the chief counter intelligence official who will make a decision in agreement with the works security police and the central camp management".

(PX 1075, NIK-13296, Bk. 34 A, pp. 5,6).

A half year later von Buelow advised a Krupp employee that there had been no change in the regulations.

"Herrn Drees
for your information - Eastern workers have to be escorted by the plant from and to work. Exceptions: Marching in troops under supervision of a trustworthy Eastern worker - only if in conformity with notice !

26 May 1944

(Signature): von Buelow"

(PX 956, NIK-11966, Bk. 34, pp. 105, 106).

The following month minutes of a meeting of the Special Labor Allocation Officers note that "According to latest regulations plants have to fetch the Eastern workers to work or else make some trustworthy Eastern worker responsible as transport guard." PX 1230, NIK-9800, Bk. 43, pp. 52, 54.

Examination of the evidence presented by the Defense has disclosed nothing which controverts this clear proof that, even after March 25, 1944, the Eastern workers continued to be prisoners within Germany.

In addition to being marched back and forth to work under guard the Eastern workers were confined to their camps. In September 1942, Ihn advised the plants that,

"Eastern workers, whose conduct and output in the plant are good and whose behavior in the camp is blameless may be allowed once in a while to go out under supervision. If possible they shall be led out every second Sunday. * * *

"Only reliable members of the working force (Gefolgschaftsmitglieder) may be chosen as escorts. Further instructions are laid down in a directive which will be issued to the escorts by the workpolice. * * * PX 963, NIK-11187, Bk. 35, p. 10.

Even this limited privilege was available to a very limited number. Fritz Fuehrer testified on this point,

"Q. What about the free time of the Eastern workers and their right to move about ?

A. First of all, they were not allowed to go out during the week, but later by order of the Gestapo inspectors twenty per cent of the people were allowed to go out under a German guard on Sundays.

People were to be suggested from the plant who would be suitable guards on such occasions. In actual practice it was not always possible to do that. People sometimes did not come back at all, they stayed out or they came back at all hours, so eventually we appointed a decent Eastern worker as a guard who would take his little group for a walk."

Tr. 8303.

In the spring of 1943 the Eastern workers were given slightly more freedom. Any worker who could secure a pass from his camp leader could stay out until dusk, Ernst Amman, Tr. pp. 1458-1459; Fritz Fuehrer, Tr. pp. 8303, 8304; Robert Schulten, Tr. p. 10324. Even this limited freedom was subsequently withdrawn and the Eastern workers again only permitted out under guard. Amman's testimony on this point is unequivocal,

" * * * official permission was granted for the inmates to go out and leave the camp. These camp inmates were allowed to walk around the town without any guards. Only later when we had been heavily damaged by air raids, the authorities issued a curfew, and then there were always volunteers among the German employees, who together with the camp inmates made excursions into the town and the surrounding territory; but of course, one could never say that they were armed. On the contrary, these German workers were volunteers who said they would take the foreign workers out.

"Q. Do I understand you correctly that in the beginning they had permission to walk out freely, and only later due to the very difficult conditions that it was restricted ?

"A. Yes, that is correct".

(T. p. 1438).

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"Q. You spoke of restrictions coming later, I didn't pursue that . . . what was the nature of the restrictions that came later ?

"A. The foreigners were no longer allowed to walk about in the city without guard or escort. They could only walk in close formation and with an escort."

(Tr. p. 1461).

The witnesses called by the defense have not referred to this revocation of even the very limited freedom allowed the Eastern workers. However, in an affidavit given by an Assistant Camp Leader of the Eastern workers' camp Voerde, which was first occupied in the summer of 1944, it is stated that "the Eastern workers generally were forbidden to leave Voerde" and the affiant states that he was fined for giving an Eastern worker a pass to visit his wife in the hospital, DX 2165, Kpk. 380, Bk. 6B, pp. 47, 48. This affidavit clearly reinforces and substantiates the evidence elicited from Amman.

In the face of this clear evidence of confinement, supported by both the prosecution and defense witnesses and contemporaneous documents, the gross dishonesty of the following testimony by Constantin Arbatoff is manifest:

"Q. Did the Eastern workers have some freedom of movement, or were they restricted in that ?

A. The freedom of Eastern workers
in Germany is unbelievable for
many people."
(Tr. p. 6723).

Far from seeking to lighten the confinement within which
these workers were held, the Krupp firm against every
relaxation. So, when German shopkeepers in Essen were
permitting Eastern workers to buy, von Buelow gave orders
to tighten up the restrictions on Eastern workers going to
and from work so as to deprive them of even this small
concession. His memorandum to Lehmann and Kupke, dated
22 October 1943, forwarding and commenting on the most
recent instructions issued by the Gestapo concerning Eastern
workers, reads,

"It is indeed very deplorable that
the general order which prohibits
visits to German stores by Eastern
workers is being violated so fre-
quently. In any case we should
hold to the rule that on their way
to and from work the detachments
remain in closed ranks and that
then visits to stores can not be
made." PX 969-NIK-9206, Bk. 35,
p. 13.

Similarly, Krupp, on various pretexts, retained barbed wire around its camps for Eastern workers despite official orders issued in the middle of 1942 directing the removal of such barbed wire.

A letter sent out by the Reich Group Industry on 4 June 1942 and forwarded by the District Group Northwest of the Economic Group Iron Producing Industry (WGE) to its members reads:

"Camps will not be fenced in with barbed wire. Where barbed wire has been used it will be removed" (PX 966, NIK 12165, Bk 35, pp. 7, 8; PX 948, NIK 11276, Bk 34, p. 79).

Nevertheless, on 4 August 1942 von Buelow sent a memorandum to the Housing Administration through Lehmann, after an inspection of the Eastern workers' camp at Spenlestrasse instructing them that "the barbed-wire fence should be made much stronger" (PX 1547, NIK 15435, Reb Bk 2B, Supp. 1, p. 29). A month later Loeser's subordinate, Dr. Beusch, at a meeting held of the various departments concerned with the completion of the foreign workers' camps recognized the official instruction against barbed-wire fences.

"The fencing in of the Eastern workers' barracks with barbed wire is inadmissible. Same must be dispensed with in the future so that no objections will be raised. The removal of the existing barbed-wire fences will be discussed at the next meeting" (PX 1364, NIK 13364, Bk 40A, p. 1).

Von Buelow, however, opposed the removal of these fences and took the opportunity, during the inspection of the workers' camps on 14 October 1942 by officials of the German Labor Front, to secure permission to retain them. The report submitted to the Direktorium on this visit reads:

". . . The question of barbed wire was raised by Herr von Buelow, who enumerated the various offices demanding that the barbed wire should be removed, but this could not be justified for practical reasons. Herr Hassel spoke briefly of the necessity for it. Herr Schlessmann said we need not worry about the barbed wire; as long as there was not other wire available it would be expedient to go on using barbed wire, in order to guarantee segregation" (PX 905, D 144, Bk 36, pp. 18, 22, 23).

The defense has attempted to counter the clear proof contained in the documents of the reluctance of von Buelow and the Krupp firm, despite official orders, to remove the barbed wire from the Eastern workers' camps, by eliciting from various witnesses testimony as to a secret order of the Gestapo ostensibly in conflict with those of the other agencies charged with the welfare of foreign labor, which secret order Krupp, despite the unanimous opposition of the firm, including von Buelow, to the retention of such barbed wire, was bound to respect (Rudolf Schultz, Tr. 11292-11304; Constantin Arbatoff, Tr. 6724).

The documentary evidence is directly contrary to such assertion. In endeavoring to reconcile the documents with his testimony that von Buelow was at all times opposed to the use of barbed wire, the witness Rudolf Schultz, upon whom the defense chiefly relied for this portion of the case, was led into so many absurdities as to demonstrate the absolute falsity of his testimony (DX 1581, v.B. 467, Bk 13, p. 45; Tr. 11292-11304).

The most compelling proof of the absence of any such secret order of the Gestapo is the complete failure of the defense to produce such order, although it has introduced any number of documents emanating from the secret files of the Gestapo. On the contrary, the evidence introduced by the defense shows that the Gestapo, like every other agency in Germany, ordered the removal of the barbed wire in the spring of 1942, after Hitler expressed his surprise that "the civilian Russians are kept behind barbed-wire fences like prisoners of war" (DX 1580, v.B. 119, Bk 13, p. 44).

On 25 April 1942 the Gestapo headquarters at Duesseldorf forwarded a decree issued by Himmler, Chief of the Gestapo and the SS, concerning the treatment of workers from the

pre-1939 Russian territory, in which it was clearly stated: "The fencing in of the camps must not be done with barbed wire. Barbed wire already there must be removed" (underlining in the original; DX 1573, v.B. 120, Bk 13, pp. 9, 13). Only where "no other wire can be procured due to the present shortage of material" was the Gestapo willing to permit its retention (DX 1582, v.B. 344, Bk 13, p. 48). It is out of this latter concession that the defense tried to spell its "order."

As late as March 1943, a year after the Gestapo had ordered the removal of barbed-wire fences, the Eastern workers' camps turned over to the Main Camp Administration were still surrounded by such fences (Lorenz Tenhuenfeld, Tr. 10287; cf. Rudolf Schultz, Tr. 11297-98).

The contradictory nature of the testimony given by defense witnesses is again demonstrated in connection with this issue. Fritz Fuehrer, leader of the camp, testified that Kraemerplatz initially had a barbed wire fence because it had been a prisoner of war camp and that when the fence collapsed it was replaced with a normal fence (Tr. 8295). Arbatoff testified that "the first group of Russian workers came to the Kraemerplatz and this camp was not surrounded by barbed wire, only part of it where there was no wooden fence, a barbed wire was put up" (Tr. 6724). Arbatoff further elaborated his lie by stating that he believed Kraemerplatz to be the only camp with a barbed-wire fence. The documents clearly show that at least Spenlestrasse likewise was so surrounded (PX 1547, NIK 15435, Reb Bk 2B, Supp 1, p. 29).

Actually, whether or not the Eastern workers' camps had barbed-wire fences or not their inhabitants were prisoners (DX 2158, Kpk 373, Bk. 6B, pp. 20, 22).

The significance of Krupp's failure to remove the barbed wire lies in the illumination it sheds on the attitude of the firm toward its Eastern slaves. Many of the discriminating practices to which the Eastern worker was subjugated were the product of government orders. An individual firm could not affect the confiscatory taxes exacted from the Eastern worker nor lift the need for wearing the humiliating "Ost" badge, but other matters rested within the discretion of the plant. The documents clearly reveal that Krupp always exercised that discretion to the disadvantage of the Eastern workers.

In insisting on the retention of barbed wire Krupp even ran counter to the government regulations to impose harsher conditions than they demanded.

The documents consistently reflect Krupp's lack of mercy. In September 1943 the Reich Association Iron advised its members that political commissars among the Russian prisoners of war (who, according to instructions issued the German Army, were to be liquidated, IMT Judgment, p. 229) could be recognized by their gold teeth and should be reported to the base camp immediately (PX 627, NI 1600, Bk 17, p. 185). Von Buelow, on his own initiative, instructed Dr. Wiele to look for such gold teeth during medical examination of Eastern workers "since it is known that escaped Russian prisoners of war often sneak in among the Eastern workers" (PX 1592, NIK 12942, Reb Bk 3, p. 102). A year later, when the RVE requested that "unreliable foreigners" be reported to the Gestapo, von Buelow forwarded the communication to the Works

Police with the comment that "at best these instructions can induce us to apply more severe measures in such cases" (PX 626, NIK 11268, Bk 17, p. 184).

The cross-examination of Hedwig Fahrenholt, Wilshauss' secretary, is illuminating. The witness had given an affidavit in which she stated that "Von Buelow judged such cases (requiring a report by the Gestapo) not according to the letter of the law but took into consideration also the special circumstances in the particular instance trying to do it justice. I still remember some cases where a report was omitted due to von Buelow's intercession" (DX 1918, v.B. 276, Bk 16, pp. 12, 13). She was examined on this point as follows:

"Q. You remember some specific cases where by intervention of Herr von Buelow, a report was dropped?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Give me one specific instance, will you?

"A. I cannot tell you whether that was a criminal case or a case to be reported to the Gestapo, but I remember such cases existed.

"Q. You mentioned specifically in your affidavit: 'I still recall.' That means on the day you deposed your affidavit, on the 23rd of February, 1948, you still recalled some cases. Well, let's have only one instance.

"A. I cannot do so, but I can recall that there were cases like that one I mentioned.

"Q. Witness, an affidavit is not a thing to be sneezed at, and I want to point out that if in your affidavit you state: 'I still recall instances' that means you recall them.

"A. But I cannot give you the names.

"Q. Well, describe the circumstances if you are unable to recall the names.

"A. I know that cases happened.

"Q. I want one specific instance, only.

"A. I know one specific case where a worker--well, how was it--

"Q. Witness, if you are unable to continue, then let's drop this point." (Tr. 11719)

4. Living Conditions

(a) Camps

The camps to which the Eastern workers were confined were crowded, dirty and inadequate. Although the Krupp firm represented to the Berlin authorities in July 1942 that there were no "substantial difficulties concerning billeting" (PX 1558, NIK-15513, R.Bk.3,p.3) actually it was not prepared to cope with the foreign workers brought into Essen on its request in the Fall of 1942. So that, long before the Allied air raids could be blamed for living conditions, the housing of the Russian workers was bad.

The day after Krupp advised the Ministry of Armament and Munitions that it could billet the additional eight thousand workers it had requested the department in Krupp responsible for housing the workers advised the building office that "the miserable conditions at Camp Spenlestrasse have reached a stage which could hardly be surpassed" PX 1545, NIK-15436, R.Bk. 2B, Supp. 1, p. 25. This was due to the fact that the Eastern workers were moved into camps before they were finished and while they still lacked such minimum essentials as toilets and washrooms. At Amalienstrasse, von Buelow noted, in August 1942, "For approximately 150 in the camp there is just one latrine and one toilet available" PX 1547, NIK-15435, R.Bk.2B,Supp.1, p.29. As late as December 1942, six months after the Eastern workers had moved in to the Spenlestrasse camp and which then housed 1,422 people (DX 2022, Kpk 204, Bk. 3D,p.8) the washing and lavatory facilities for the women's camps were still incomplete, PX 1546, NIK-15454,R.Bk. 2B,Supp. 1,p.27. Not only were the camps unfinished, but more workers were placed in them than they could accomodate, so that two workers were forced to share the same bed. When Lauffer, who was in charge of the housing of these workers advised Girod, who was responsible for labor allocation, that this was true of at least two camps in October 1942, he was directed to ascertain " how many persons could be billeted by means of the overcrowding of further hutments and by raising the two-tier bunks so that another additional person could sleep between them ".

PX 1544, NIK-13306, Bk. R 2B, Supp. 1, p.22 .

Krupp was so hard pressed for accommodations at this time that some of the Eastern workers were housed in tents despite the cold; others in huts without any heating. PX 905, D-144, Bk. 36, pp. 18, 22.

In December 1942 officials of one of the government agencies inspected the Eastern workers' camps in the Ruhr area to try to determine the causes for the high number of escapes from this area. The camps inspected were those housing workers in the coal mines. The report is sharply condemnatory of all the camps surveyed, including Krupp's. The report reads, " Even the most urgently needed matters such as food and shelter leave much to be desired, they are insufficient, carelessly prepared, dirty and, to some extent, even bad beyond description. The barracks are partly without any lights and badly aired". As to the camps maintained by Krupp, the report continues, "There was one women's barrack at the camps which is furnished in an exemplary manner whereas others are insufficient and dirty. Already for seven months, five families have been housed in one room without any separation whatsoever. Food is sufficient. Sanitary conditions are bad since the sick barracks, etcetera, are without bed sheets and not orderly kept. Camp management is not sufficient." PX 577, NI-3013, Bk. 18, p. 174. The documents submitted by the defense confirm the picture of teeming squalor which this report suggests. A number of inventory lists made in the Spring of 1943, upon the establishment of Kupke's department, (IX 1831, Kpk. 56, Bk. 2 A, pp. 80-141) have been introduced by Defense Counsel as giving, " a very good picture of the furniture and equipment in the foreign workers' camps at the time they came under the administration of the Supreme Camp Management". Tr. p. 9111. In fact, the lists relate not only to foreign workers' camps but also to those maintained by Krupp for its German employees. The Hedwig-Dransfeld-Haus for female workers belongs

to the latter category DX 2060. Kpk.241,Bk. 4A p. 158¹ /.

Moreover, they cover only a few, and among them the smallest, of the fifty-seven camps operated at various times by Krupp. FX 1378, NIK-10214, Bk. 32A, p. 24. Nor is it possible to identify a number of them from the dates given since more than one camp had the same street address. Three, however, clearly were Eastern workers' camps when the transfer was made; Saelzerstrasse, Kraemerplatz and Dechenschule. On January 18, 1943, four hundred and forty-nine people were living at Saelzerstrasse. DX 2024, Kpk 206, Bk. 3D, pp. 14,16.

The Eastern workers at this camp slept in what had previously been a gymnasium and in the two small adjoining rooms. DX 2161, Kpk 376 Bk. 6B, p. 30. The inventory shows that in May 1943 the camp had 9 sheets, 306 blankets and 194 wooden double bedsteads or less than one blanket and one bed apiece for the Eastern workers, DX 2161, supra. On January 18, 1943 Kraemerplatz housed 1250 Eastern workers (DX 2024, supra.) In May 1943 its inventory listed 94 sheets, 1,479 blankets, 283 towels, 5 toilets non-flush, 710 iron bedsteads and 252 wooden double beds, or less than one bed to each worker, one blanket apiece and one towel for every four, DX 1831, supra, at pp. 111-114. At Dechenschule 454 Eastern workers were housed in an eight room schoolhouse equipped with "2 toilets nonflush". The camp was adequately equipped with beds and blankets but it had only 7 sheets, 61 towels and 4 chairs for its 454 occupants. DX supra; DX 2161, supra, at pp. 117-119. The conditions of the Eastern workers' camps did not improve with time but further deteriorated. There is no reason to believe that the camp maintained in 1944 by Armor Construction 4, which, as one of the plants, was then subordinate to Houdremont, is not typical. The "camp" was a concrete or stone hut erected approximately ten meters away from the plant "so

that the foreign workers would be closer to the plant in order to
1/ The first page of this exhibit contains a typographical error in the English document book and states the nationality of the inhabitants of the Hedwig-Dransfeld-Haus to be "Mixed". The original exhibit, however, gives the nationality as "German" as do all the later reports contained in the same exhibit.